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INTRODUCTION 
Consider a law firm partner who ascribes a feminine iden- 
tity script to his female associate.1 The partner assumes the as- 
sociate conforms to traditionally understood notions of feminin- 
ity, carrying herself softly and putting family commitments 
before career ambitions.2 To advance her career, the associate 
will likely negotiate3 that gender script by toeing a fine line—at 
times, rejecting the script to convey that she is assertive 
enough to compete in male-dominated environments and, at 
other times, performing the script to avoid stigma traditionally 
imposed on aggressive women.4 
In a burgeoning body of legal scholarship, commentators 
have been explicating the harmful effects of such script negoti- 
ations and prescribing remedies accordingly.5 While this scho- 
 
1. This Article uses the term “identity script” to refer to actions and cha- 
racteristics expected of an individual based on her perceived identity; these 
figurative scripts are developed by aggregating stereotypes regarding the 
script’s subject. See Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and 
Group Portraits of Race and Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 263, 290 
(1995) (defining identity scripts as “cluster[s] of expectations”). This definition 
of identity scripts is related to, but distinguishable from, the definition 
adopted by Kwame Anthony Appiah in his seminal works. See KWAME AN- 
THONY APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY 21–23, 65–71 (2005) (discussing 
identity scripts); see also infra Part I.A (discussing identity scripts and Ap- 
piah’s work). 
2. See Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 
1093, 1132 (2008) (“Female attorneys are often presumed to be softer, less ag- 
gressive, and burdened in their ability to put work first because of family 
commitments.”). 
3. This Article uses the term “negotiation” to refer to how one manages 
the identity scripts that others ascribe to her. Depending on context, an indi- 
vidual may manage her scripts by adhering to them, or she may manage her 
scripts by rejecting them. For elaboration on negotiation processes, see infra 
Part I.A. 
4. See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL 
RIGHTS 149, 154 –58 (2006) (describing pressures on women both to embrace 
and to reject femininity while employed at traditionally male workplaces). 
Walking this fine line was demanded of Ann Hopkins in the landmark case of 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 232–37 (1989) (quoting other 
workers’ praise of her achievement and criticism of her aggressiveness). 
5. See, e.g., YOSHINO, supra note 4, at 74 –166 (presenting his theory of 
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larship has generally focused on the harms suffered by individ- 
uals,6 this Article takes a different tack, illuminating harms at 
a systemic level—harms to democracy. This Article posits that 
ascribed7 identity scripts undermine democratic deliberation, 
 
“covering” identities); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Conversations at 
Work, 79 OR. L. REV. 103, 113–22 (2000) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Con- 
versations] (discussing the effects of stereotyping on workplace conversation 
strategies); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Race to the Top of the Corporate 
Ladder: What Minorities Do When They Get There, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1645, 1672–77 (2004) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Race to the Top] (consi- 
dering racial types that are more likely to succeed in the corporate environ- 
ment); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CON- 
TEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 714 –28 (2001) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Fifth 
Black Woman] (analyzing the “identity performance problem”); Devon W. Car- 
bado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1263–67 
(2000) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity] (showing how identity 
negotiation is “work”); Frank Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity: 
Intersectionality, Assimilation, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 853, 874 –88 (2006) (criticizing the dichotomy of the “Good Black 
Man” and the “Bad Black Man”); Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrim- 
ination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 623, 643–53 (2005) (discussing the pressure for people 
to conform their identities to work culture); Paul Horwitz, Uncovering Identity, 
105 MICH. L. REV. 1283, 1284 (2007) (reviewing YOSHINO, supra note 4, and 
expanding upon Yoshino’s concepts of “self ” and “identity”); Holning Lau, Plu- 
ralism: A Principle for Children’s Rights, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 317, 322– 
35 (2007) (discussing the effects of “assimilation demands” on children’s iden- 
tities); Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On 
Being “Regarded as” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha 
and Jamal Are White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1290–1313 [hereinafter Onwu- 
achi-Willig & Barnes, By Any Other Name] (analyzing the social construction 
of racial identity); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Undercover Other, 94 CAL. L. REV. 
873, 883–98 (2006) [hereinafter Onwuachi-Willig, Undercover Other] (consi- 
dering the role of “passing” in performing racial and sexual identities); Angela 
Onwuachi-Willig, Volunteer Discrimination, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.  1895,  
1914 –27 (2007) (discussing three types of performative behavior by African 
Americans in response to the NBA appearance code); Gowri Ramachandran, 
Intersectionality as “Catch 22”: Why Identity Performance Demands Are Nei- 
ther Harmless Nor Reasonable, 69 ALB. L. REV. 299, 305–13 (2005) (critically 
examining and elaborating on theories of “identity performance”); Camille 
Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination By Proxy 
and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1145–71 (2004) (compar- 
ing morphology-based and performance-based identity ascription); Russell K. 
Robinson, Uncovering Covering, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1809, 1839–48 (2007) (re- 
viewing YOSHINO, supra note 4, and comparing his concepts to those in Car- 
bado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra). 
6. See supra note 5; see also Tristin K. Green, Discomfort at Work: 
Workplace Assimilation Demands and the Contact Hypothesis, 86 N.C. L. REV. 
379, 382 (2008) (noting that literature on script negotiations “tends to frame 
the issue largely in terms of individual interests”). But see Green, supra, at 
383 (noting that pressures to negotiate identity scripts undermine not only in- 
dividual interests, but also society’s collective interest in social equality). 
7. Note that this Article takes issue with ascribed identity scripts. Going 
forward, this Article uses the term “identity script” as shorthand for “ascribed 
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thereby contributing to a democratic deficit,8 and that equal 
protection doctrine should ameliorate that deficit. 
Just as the hypothetical law firm associate negotiates 
gender scripts, individuals often negotiate identity scripts in 
the political sphere. Consider the prominent example of Barack 
Obama. Commentators have argued that Americans typically 
perceive President Obama as a black man and ascribe him cor- 
responding scripts for “acting black,”9 which Obama has care- 
fully negotiated to attain and maintain power.10 This negotia- 
tion process has entailed alternating between performance and 
rejection of scripted black identity. Other politicians, journal- 
ists, and citizens engaged in political deliberation similarly ne- 
gotiate ascribed identity scripts. 
These ascribed identity scripts contribute to a democratic 
deficit in at least three regards. First, they create barriers to 
entry, limiting the scope of participants in democratic delibera- 
tion. For example, only African Americans who associate and 
disassociate with black identity scripts in very particular ways 
can achieve standing on the political stage.11 By unduly limit- 
ing the scope of individuals who successfully mount the politi- 
 
identity script” unless otherwise stated. Part I.A elaborates on the relation- 
ship between ascribed scripts and expectations that individuals voluntarily 
claim. Cf. Thuy N. Bui, The Difference Between Race and Color: Implications 
for Changing the Racial Discourse, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 629, 632–34 
(1998) (reviewing YOSHINO, supra note 4, and discussing identity scripts as 
“ascribed”); Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 5, at 1261 n.2 
(distinguishing “‘sense of self ’ identity” from “‘attributional’ identity,” which is 
roughly synonymous to this Article’s notion of “ascribed” identity scripts). 
8. The term “democratic deficit” refers to deficiencies concerning a gov- 
ernment’s realization of democratic political order. See Sanford Levinson, The 
Democratic Deficit in America, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (Online) (Dec. 4, 2006), 
http://www.hlpronline.com/2006/12/the-democratic-deficit-in-america/ (describ- 
ing the concept of “democratic deficit”). 
9. See HENRY LOUIS GATES, JR., LOOSE CANNONS: NOTES ON THE CUL- 
TURE WARS 101 (1992) (“One must learn to be ‘black’ in this society, precisely 
because ‘blackness’ is a socially produced category.”). 
10. See, e.g., Devon Carbado, What Voters ‘Don’t Ask’ but Can ‘Tell’ About 
Obama’s Race, DAILY J. (L.A.), Aug. 28, 2008, at 6 (discussing “Obama’s racial 
double bind”); Marcus Mabry, Color Test: Where Whites Draw the Line, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 8, 2008, (Week in Review), at 1 (same); Patricia J. Williams, 
L’Étranger, NATION, Mar. 5, 2007, at 11, 14 –15 (same). 
11. See Carbado, supra note 10 (“[Obama] can be neither ‘too black’ nor 
‘not black enough.’”). Commentators have made similar arguments regarding 
racial minorities in employment settings. See, e.g., Carbado & Gulati, Working 
Identity, supra note 5, at 1269–70 (giving the example of positive and negative 
stereotypes in the law firm setting); Cooper, supra note 5, at 884 (noting that 
corporations “reward race-distancing strategies and punish race-identifying 
strategies”). 
  
2010] IDENTITY SCRIPTS 901 
 
cal stage, identity scripts undermine the collective ideal of 
democratic governance. Second, script negotiations distort the 
deliberative conversations that ensue among political actors be- 
cause script negotiations often entail self-censorship.12 Third, 
identity scripts distort the way communications are received 
during deliberation.13 
These impairments should inform an influential school of 
constitutional theory, which this Article will refer to as “democ- 
racy reinforcement theory.” According to the theory, an over- 
arching goal of constitutional jurisprudence should be to rein- 
force democracy.14 Understanding identity scripts’ effects on 
democratic deliberation illuminates new directions for democ- 
racy reinforcement theory, especially with regard to equal pro- 
tection jurisprudence. 
The remainder of this Article unfolds in three Parts. Part I 
describes in greater detail the ways in which identity scripts 
undermine deliberative democracy. Part II provides back- 
ground on democracy reinforcement theory and develops a new 
branch within that school of thought, which this Article will re- 
fer to as “script-oriented” democracy reinforcement theory. This 
new approach focuses on how constitutional doctrine can ame- 
 
 
12. See Carol C. Gould, Diversity and Democracy: Representing Differenc- 
es, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE 
POLITICAL 171, 180–81 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY 
AND DIFFERENCE] (discussing the effect of difference on political participation); 
Iris Marion Young, Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative De- 
mocracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE, supra, at 120, 122–25 (arguing 
that deliberative democracy’s tendency toward equality can prioritize certain 
communication strategies); cf. Carbado & Gulati, Conversations, supra note 5, 
at 113–22 (discussing how identity scripts regulate expression in corporate 
settings). 
13. Cf. Carbado & Gulati, Conversations, supra note 5, at 113–22 (discuss- 
ing how, in corporate settings, identity scripts distort the reception of commu- 
nications). 
14. This Article uses “democracy reinforcement theory” as an umbrella 
term for theories that share this goal, even though not all theorists under the 
umbrella have explicitly adopted the term. Commentators typically trace de- 
mocracy reinforcement theory to John Hart Ely. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Fo- 
reword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 13–14 (1996) (citing 
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 4 –7 (1980)). While this Article 
concentrates on equal protection jurisprudence, commentators have applied 
democracy reinforcement theory to constitutional jurisprudence more general- 
ly. For examples of democracy reinforcement theorists, see CASS SUNSTEIN, 
THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 17–39 (1993) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL 
CONSTITUTION] (tracing the historical development of the theory), and Jane S. 
Schacter, Ely and the Idea of Democracy, 57 STAN. L. REV. 737, 742–53 (2004) 
(discussing Ely’s conception of democracy). 
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liorate the democratic deficit caused by ascribed identity 
scripts. Part III applies script-oriented democracy reinforce- 
ment theory to four areas of equal protection jurisprudence: the 
question of how to determine suspect statuses, the sex discrim- 
ination argument for same-sex marriage, the topic of racial in- 
tegration in public schools, and doctrine governing judicial re- 
view of racial and religious profiling. Script-oriented democracy 
reinforcement theory provides a normative compass for ad- 
dressing these four areas of controversy. 
 
I. DELIBERATION UNDERMINED 
The literature on identity scripts and the literature on de- 
liberative democracy have developed independently and, by and 
large, have remained separate. This Part provides background 
on these two bodies of writing and bridges them, describing 
how identity scripts weaken deliberative democracy. 
A. BACKGROUND ON SCRIPTS 
As noted at the outset, this Article uses the term “identity 
scripts” to refer to the expectations imposed on individuals 
based on their perceived identities.15 While authors sometimes 
seem to use the terms “scripts” and “stereotypes” synonymous- 
ly,16 this Article considers scripts the product of aggregating 
stereotypes.17 Consider a hypothetical Asian American man 
who is stereotyped as emasculated, disloyally foreign, and a 
 
15. See Karst, supra note 1, at 290 (defining identity scripts as “cluster[s] 
of expectations”). 
16. See, e.g., Emily Houh, Critical Race Realism: Re-Claiming the Anti- 
discrimination Principle Through the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 
66 U. PITT. L. REV. 455, 464 (2005) (giving “scripting” as a synonym for stereo- 
typing); Helen Norton, Stepping Through Grutter’s Open Door: What the Uni- 
versity of Michigan Affirmative Action Cases Mean for Race-Conscious Gov- 
ernment Decisionmaking, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 543, 568 (2005) (using the terms 
script and stereotype interchangeably). 
17. A note on choice of terminology: because the terms “identity script” 
and “stereotype” are so closely related, I contemplated omitting the term 
“identity script” and using the term “stereotype” in its place throughout this 
Article. Considering that most readers are likely more familiar with the term 
“stereotype,” I hesitated to complicate the discussion by adopting the termino- 
logical framework of scripts, which may strike some readers as jargonistic. Ul- 
timately, however, I decided to focus on identity scripts because I think the 
term “script” captures the relationship among stereotypes better than the 
term “stereotype” alone does. This relational dynamic is discussed below in 
notes 18–30 and the accompanying text. It is worth noting that this Article’s 
criticism of identity scripts subsumes criticism of the individual stereotypes 
that contribute to the content of scripts. 
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“model minority” who excels in particular fields of work and 
study.18 These stereotypes coalesce, forming a script to which 
the man is expected to conform. 
The notion of scripts suggests connectivity among stereo- 
types. In this regard, identity scripts are similar to theatrical 
scripts. If someone familiar with the script for Romeo and Ju- 
liet19 turns on the television and sees a teenage girl dressed in 
Medieval attire asking “Romeo, wherefore art thou Romeo,” he 
would likely presume that the television character will follow 
the script by tragically ending her life. Similarly, if an Asian 
American man adheres to part of an Asian American identity 
script, others will often presume that he adheres to other parts 
of the script. For example, if the Asian American man is rela- 
tively passive and speaks with an accent, people whose think- 
ing is influenced by stereotypes will likely infer that he is an 
industrious model minority.20 In this regard, an identity  
script’s stereotypes are mutually reinforcing. Psychological lite- 
rature supports this notion of connectivity. Using a different 
metaphor to describe this connectivity, psychologist David 
Schneider explained that “[w]hen stereotypes are active, a me- 
taphorical stereotype gun may be cocked, waiting for a relevant 
stereotype behavior to fire inferences of other stereotype 
traits.”21 
 
18. See ERIC LIU, THE ACCIDENTAL ASIAN: NOTES OF A NATIVE SPEAKER 
115–27 (1998) (discussing stereotypes of Asian Americans as unpatriotic fo- 
reigners); FRANK H. WU, YELLOW: RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND 
WHITE 39–130 (2002) (discussing the “model minority” and “perpetual foreign- 
er” stereotypes of Asian Americans); John M. Kang, Deconstructing the Ideolo- 
gy of White Aesthetics, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 283, 347–49 (1997) (discussing 
the popular portrayal of Asian American men as effeminate); Jean Shin, The 
Asian American Closet, 11 ASIAN L.J. 1, 3–7 (2004) (describing stereotypes of 
Asian Americans as “foreigners” and “model minorities”). 
19. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 1. 
20. The film BETTER LUCK TOMORROW (Paramount Pictures 2003) depicts 
a similar dynamic. Because the film’s main characters are Asian American 
high school students who comport with some expectations for model minori- 
ties—for example, they are successful academically—they seem literally to get 
away with murder because others have difficulty viewing these students as 
criminals; there is dissonance between criminality and the script depicting 
Asian Americans as model minorities. See Rene Rodriguez, Funny, Weird, ‘Bet- 
ter Luck’ Traces Erosion of a Straight-A Good Kid, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 18, 
2002, at 8G, available at http://www.betterlucktomorrow.com/review.php?id= 
18 (discussing Better Luck Tomorrow’s critique of the model minority script). 
21. DAVID J. SCHNEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF STEREOTYPING 194 (2004). 
Schneider’s assertion is informed by “implicit personality theory,” which sug- 
gests that stereotypes are networked. See also, e.g., Richard D. Ashmore & 
Frances K. Del Boca, Sex Stereotypes and Implicit Personality Theory: Toward 
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Rejecting identity scripts takes work.22 Ascribed scripts are 
difficult to reject because of humans’ cognitive biases.23 Psycho- 
logical research suggests that people are prone to mentally reg- 
ister instances in which individuals conform to stereotypes and, 
in contrast, people tend not to register instances where indi- 
viduals break stereotypes.24 As Linda Hamilton Krieger put it, 
cognitive biases “insulate . . . stereotypes from the corrective ef- 
fects of disconfirming evidence.”25 Due to cognitive biases, iden- 
tity scripts are strongly ascribed and burdensome to reject. 
Because scripts are so strongly ascribed, our hypothetical 
Asian American man must take considerable steps to reject a 
script if he wants to convince others that it does not adequately 
 
 
 
a Cognitive-Social Psychological Conceptualization, 5 SEX ROLES 219, 220 
(1979) (discussing specifically the relationship between sex stereotypes and 
implicit personality theory); Jacques-Phillipe Leyens et al., The Social Jud- 
geability Approach to Stereotypes, 3 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCH. 91 (1992) (noting 
the relationship between stereotypes and implicit personality theory). In his 
book, Schneider offers striking examples of how individuals experience net- 
worked stereotypes. For example, he describes a black professional who “wor- 
ries . . . about ordering barbeque when he eats in the presence of whites; he 
has a slight fear that they might infer that he also is lazy and will break into a 
rap song.” SCHNEIDER, supra, at 194 –95. Schneider also explains that 
“[p]rofessional women may fear discussing their home life and children, be- 
cause others may too readily infer nurturing qualities and a lack of business- 
related agentic ones.” Id. at 195. To be clear, although this Article uses the 
term “identity scripts” to describe a phenomenon supported by psychology lite- 
rature, the term itself is not part of standard psychology vocabulary. In psy- 
chology literature, the term “scripts” is used to refer more broadly to a range of 
expected social interactions that may have little to do with identity. See, e.g., 
GORDON B. MOSKOWITZ, SOCIAL COGNITION: UNDERSTANDING SELF AND OTH- 
ERS 162 (2005) (explaining that when “there is a row of cash registers at the 
front of a restaurant,” the customer knows to follow the “script” of “order[ing] 
food there rather than sitting down and waiting for a waitress”). 
22. This concept that managing stereotypes amounts to “work” comes 
from Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 5, at 1263–67 (describing 
the types of “work” that people perform on their identities). 
23. See KENNETH S. BORDENS & IRWIN A. HORWITZ, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
158–84 (2d ed. 2002) (providing background on cognitive biases related to per- 
ceptions of stereotyped traits); James L. Hilton & William von Hippel, Stereo- 
types, 47 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 237, 251–52 (1996) (same); Linda Hamilton Krieg- 
er, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 
1197–98 (1995) (same). 
24. See Hilton & von Hippel, supra note 23, at 252 (“At the most basic lev- 
el, perceivers sometimes simply refuse to make any inferences at all when con- 
fronted with stereotype incongruency . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
25. Krieger, supra note 23, at 1198. 
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describe him.26 For example, politicians may generally feel 
pressured to demonstrate their patriotism, but the Asian Amer- 
ican politician faces a particularly heavy burden of proving pa- 
triotism because he has been stereotyped as foreign and disloy- 
al.27 This dynamic is especially true for Americans of South 
Asian descent whom, since 9/11, mainstream society has ste- 
reotyped as exceptionally foreign and disloyal.28 To reject these 
stereotypes, a politician of South Asian descent might need to 
go beyond adorning a flag pin on his lapel and take particularly 
strong policy positions that are symbolically patriotic—for ex- 
ample, supporting war efforts—even though he would not be 
inclined to take those positions otherwise. 
Indeed, individuals go to great lengths to negotiate their 
ascribed scripts. The work required to negotiate scripts is cer- 
tainly not unique to the hypothetical Asian American politi- 
cian. Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati have provided other ex- 
amples in their writings on employment. For instance, they 
have suggested that, to negate scripts associating African 
American men with laziness, some African American men will 
work longer hours than otherwise required.29 Similarly, for our 
hypothetical female lawyer to break feminine stereotypes of 
 
26. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 21, at 194 –95 (describing steps taken to 
reject scripts); see also Shin, supra note 18, at 20 (“[R]acially-based assump- 
tions are not easily overcome by simple denials or logic.”). 
27. See WU, supra note 18, at 79–130 (describing the perception of Asian 
Americans as unpatriotic “perpetual foreigners”); Shin, supra note 18, at 5–7 
(discussing the “foreigner” stereotype). 
28. See Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 
1586–91 (2002) (discussing the prevalence in the post-9/11 era of stereotyping 
Asians as disloyal foreigners and potential terrorists); Amy Gardner & Spenc- 
er S. Hsu, Airline Apologizes for Booting Nine Passengers, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 
2009, at A1 (discussing a pattern of cases in which airline security agents ra- 
cially profiled South Asians, among others, as potential threats). 
29. Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 5, at 1292–93. Carba- 
do & Gulati also explain: 
[W]hile all the employees in our hypothetical law firm have an incen- 
tive to demonstrate that they have the potential to become partners, 
the burden of proof, and thus the precise nature of the incentive, va- 
ries across identities. 
Recall the assumption that Korean-American Harvard Law 
School graduates are generally perceived as quiet, unassertive, good 
at math and science (detail-oriented work), and lacking in creativity 
and personality. . . . [These characteristics] conflict with the qualities 
that the firm requires in the employees it plans to groom for partner- 
ship. The stronger this conflict, the harder the employee will have to 
work to overcome the negative assumptions by employing stereotype- 
negating strategies. 
Id. at 1267 (emphasis added). 
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passivity, she likely would take extra steps to convey her asser- 
tiveness, perhaps speaking up more often and more forcefully 
than her male peers. 
The connectivity among stereotypes in an identity script 
further complicates the script negotiation process. To reject the 
stereotype of passivity, our female lawyer would likely need to 
reject other aspects of femininity as well. For example, she has 
incentives to self-censor discussions of her children because her 
colleagues may be prone to infer that women who adhere to 
nurturing stereotypes also adhere to passivity stereotypes.30 
Note that this Article focuses on ascribed scripts, even 
though identity scripts are sometimes described as being 
claimed instead of ascribed.31 To understand the difference be- 
tween these two dynamics, consider ascribed scripts first. In in- 
terpersonal interactions, one party will perceive the other party 
as belonging to particular social groups. Upon labeling the per- 
ceived party with a group identity, the perceiver will ascribe a 
script that corresponds to that label.32 For example, upon labe- 
ling someone as an Asian American woman, the perceiver likely 
associates the perceived individual with a script consisting of 
stereotypes on Asian American women. 
These stereotypes come in two general forms: descriptive 
and normative.33 For example, as a descriptive matter, main- 
stream society often views Asian American women as being 
particularly passive;34 at the same time, from a normative 
standpoint, society may insist that Asian American women 
(and women generally) groom themselves in traditionally femi- 
 
 
30. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 21, at 125 (noting that people pay atten- 
tion to the behavior of others to confirm their expectations). 
31. See infra notes 41–44 and accompanying text (discussing “scripts”). 
32. See APPIAH, supra note 1, at 66–69 (discussing the relationship be- 
tween identification and identity). 
33. See Mary Becker, The Passions of Battered Women: Cognitive Links 
Between Passion, Empathy, and Power, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 8–9 
(2001) (comparing descriptive and normative stereotypes); Mary Anne Case, 
“The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex Discrimination 
Law as Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1488 n.197 (2000) 
(same); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Em- 
ployment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. 
L. REV. 997, 1032 (2006) (same). Kwame Anthony Appiah distinguishes be- 
tween normative and descriptive stereotypes, while further distinguishing be- 
tween two forms of descriptive stereotypes: “statistical” and “simply false” de- 
scriptive stereotypes. APPIAH, supra note 1, at 194 –95. 
34. See Houh, supra note 16, at 512–13 (discussing stereotypes of Asian 
women). 
  
2010] IDENTITY SCRIPTS 907 
nine manners.35 Both of these types of stereotypes contribute to 
expectations regarding Asian American women.36 Both regulate 
their conduct. Normative stereotypes regulate individuals by 
telling them what they ought to do. Descriptive stereotypes also 
regulate by altering individuals’ ability to express themselves; 
if an Asian woman does not self-identify with a descriptive ste- 
reotype, she will likely need to go out of her way—that is to say, 
work—to reject the descriptive stereotype.37 
It is important to acknowledge that individuals are as- 
cribed numerous scripts at once. Individuals are subject to 
scripts based on various axes of identity—for example, race, 
sex, and sexual orientation—and the interactions among these 
axes.38 For example, black women may be subject to the identi- 
ty script of the Sapphire, which is both race-specific and gend- 
er-specific.39 Any given individual may also be ascribed more 
 
35. See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text (laying out the traditional 
female script). Courts often uphold employers’ sex-specific grooming codes, 
which entrench mainstream expectations that men present themselves mascu- 
linely and women femininely; such grooming codes set requirements for dress, 
hairstyles, make-up, etc. See generally Jennifer L. Levi, Clothes Don’t Make 
the Man (or Woman), but Gender Identity Might, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 
90 (2006) (discussing case law on grooming codes). 
36. To be clear, this Article uses the term “script” to refer to both norma- 
tive expectations and descriptive expectations. Some descriptive expectations 
may be non-normative, for example, stereotypes of violence and criminality. 
Other writers have used the term “scripts” to refer to these non-normative ex- 
pectations. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Color/Identity/Justice: Chicano Tri- 
als, 53 DUKE L.J. 1569, 1586 (2004) (describing stigmatized racial scripts); 
Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 5, at 1298 n.106 (referring to 
an “unacceptable script” imposed on gay men). In contrast, Kwame Anthony 
Appiah uses the term “script” to refer specifically to normative stereotypes. 
See APPIAH, supra note 1 (stating that normative stereotypes “are close kin to 
what I’ve earlier called life-scripts”). 
37. On this sort of identity “work,” see supra notes 22–29 and accompany- 
ing text. 
38. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and 
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist 
Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 141–52 (developing 
“intersectionality” theory, which examines dynamics at the intersection of 
identity axes); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, 
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 
1244 (1991) (same); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Cri- 
tique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. 
REV. 561, 564 –67 (1997) (building on intersectionality theory to develop “mul- 
tidimensionality” theory); Peter Kwan, Jeffrey Dahmer and the Cosynthesis of 
Categories, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1257, 1280–90 (1997) (building on intersectional- 
ity theory to develop “cosynthesis” theory). 
39. See Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 539, 539–40 
(defining the Sapphire as a black woman who is “tough, domineering, emascu- 
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than one script for each axis of identity. For example, a biracial 
individual may be perceived differently by different people.40 A 
person may also be subject to more than one script even among 
those who perceive her as being a particular race. For example, 
expectations associated with blackness may differ between pre- 
dominantly black and predominantly white communities.41 A 
common denominator among all these different identity scripts 
is that they induce the democracy-impairing decisions dis- 
cussed in Part I.C. 
In addition to being ascribed, “scripts” can be claimed by 
individuals. (I put “scripts” in quotation marks here because, as 
I explain below, “script” is a misnomer for expectations that are 
claimed.)42 Achieving a sense of self is a fundamental part of 
human development.43 To some extent, the availability of iden- 
tity “scripts” facilitates that process of achieving a sense of self. 
As Kwame Anthony Appiah eloquently put it: “Autonomy, we 
know, is conventionally described as an ideal of self-authorship. 
But the metaphor should remind us that we write in a lan- 
guage we did not ourselves make.”44 Appiah elaborates that, 
“[c]ollective identities, in short, provide what we might call 
scripts: narratives that people can use in shaping their projects 
and in telling their life stories.”45 
 
 
lating, strident, and shrill”). The term “Sapphire” derives from the name of a 
character on the Amos ‘n’ Andy Show. See id. 
40. See Karst, supra note 1, 67–74. This dynamic may be even more pro- 
nounced with regard to other axes of identity such as sexual orientation. Play- 
ing on people’s (in)ability to discern other individuals’ sexual orientation, at 
least two reality television shows have been premised on challenges in which 
women attempt to discern the sexual orientation of male contestants. See 
Brian Lowry, Gay, Straight or Taken?, VARIETY, Jan. 18, 2007, at 17, available 
at http://www.variety.com/review/VE1117932400.html?categoryid=32&cs=1 
(discussing the television shows Gay, Straight or Taken? and Playing it 
Straight). Another television show required men seeking a male partner to 
discern the sexual orientation of other men. See Tim Stack, Gayme Show Déjà 
Vu, ENT. WKLY., Jan. 12, 2007, at 70, available at http://www.ew.com/ew/ 
article/0,,20007184,00.html (discussing the show Boy Meets Boy). 
41. See Robinson, supra note 5, at 1817–26 (discussing the different ex- 
pectations that mainstream society imposes on blacks, compared to the expec- 
tations imposed on blacks by self-identified blacks). 
42. See infra notes 48–49 and accompanying text (discussing claimed 
“scripts”). 
43. See id.; see also Lau, supra note 5, at 318 n.6 (drawing from the works 
of psychologist Erik Erikson to argue that identity development is an integral 
part of human development). 
44. APPIAH, supra note 1, at 156. 
45. Id. at 22. 
  
2010] IDENTITY SCRIPTS 909 
To understand this dynamic, consider the fact that achiev- 
ing a sense of religious identity is an important psychological 
project for many individuals.46 For example, to establish a reli- 
gious sense of self, someone might self-identify as Catholic. By 
labeling herself a Catholic, she is claiming an identity “script.” 
Consider that she may say that she is a Catholic, but makes it 
known to others that she does not agree with the Vatican’s view 
on same-sex marriage.47 Her rejection of the assumption that 
she condemns same-sex marriage is the exception proving the 
rule; she is implicitly welcoming others to impute certain ex- 
pectations on her based on her claimed Catholic identity, but 
not the expectation regarding same-sex marriage. In this sense, 
“scripts” are indeed important because they help individuals to 
establish their sense of self. Note, however, that the difference 
in this case is that the individual played a large part in choos- 
ing the expectations that she claims. 
Ideally, claiming a group identity should not be considered 
claiming a “script.”48 Instead, claiming group memberships 
should be akin to claiming identity templates that can be cus- 
tomized and rejected with relative ease.49 It is worth emphasiz- 
ing that this Article uses the term “script” to refer to expecta- 
tions that—unlike identity templates—are difficult to 
customize and reject.50 Part I.C explains that strongly ascribed 
scripts stifle democratic deliberation because individuals need 
to work with and around the scripts during deliberation. In 
 
46. See Lau, supra note 5, at 318 (discussing psychological literature on 
identity development). 
47. See Ian Fisher, Pope Reaffirms View Opposing Gay Marriage and 
Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, at A13 (describing the Vatican’s opposi- 
tion to same-sex marriage). 
48. See generally Michele Moody-Adams, Reflections on Appiah’s Ethics of 
Identity, 37 J. SOC. PHIL. 292 (2006) (rejecting the idea that group identities 
have rigid scripts that cannot be altered). 
49. See Anupam Chander, Diaspora Bonds, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005, 1051 
(2001) (“[R]ecognition [of identity groups] must allow for dialogue by being 
loose enough to allow the individual to reject any ‘recognized’ way of being.”). 
As Michele Moody-Adams explained: 
[I]t is impossible to claim a collective narrative as part of one’s own 
identity without inevitably altering the narrative in a potentially in- 
definite number of ways. I must interpret a narrative before I can 
adopt it, and my interpretations will alter details of the narrative 
(sometimes even significant details) in important ways. 
Moody-Adams, supra note 48, at 297. For additional background on group 
identities, see Holning Lau, Transcending the Individualist Paradigm in Sex- 
ual Orientation Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1271, 1281–84 
(2006). 
50. See supra notes 20–29 and accompanying text. 
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contrast, claimed identity templates do not stifle deliberation, 
so long as they are malleable. So long as the hypothetical Cath- 
olic woman can freely disclaim parts of the Catholic identity 
template without working51 hard to do so, deliberation will not 
be stunted. 
B. ASPIRING TO DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
Many commentators have analyzed how negotiation of 
identity scripts harms individuals’ well-being.52 In addition to 
creating these harms to individuals, negotiation of identity 
scripts generates systemic harms to democracy. Before proceed- 
ing to evaluate these systemic harms, this section elaborates on 
this Article’s vision of democracy. 
Democracy is governance based on the people’s collective 
decisionmaking.53 Views of collective governance usually take 
one of two forms: an aggregative model or a deliberative mod- 
el.54 Democratic theorists have increasingly accepted delibera- 
tive democracy as the superior goal.55 Similarly, this Article 
eschews the aggregative model for deliberative democracy. 
 
51. On this sort of identity “work,” see supra notes 22–29 and accompany- 
ing text. Contrast our hypothetical Catholic woman, who easily disclaims a 
position on same-sex marriage, with the Pakistani-American and the African 
American described supra, in notes 28–29 and accompanying text. For exam- 
ple, the African American man cannot simply disclaim laziness and work the 
same hours as other employees; he needs to work additional hours to reject 
scripted laziness. 
52. See supra note 5. 
53. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 326 (1989); 
Seyla Benhabib, Toward a Democratic Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in 
DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 12, at 67, 68 (defining democracy 
with an emphasis on collective decisionmaking); Joshua Cohen, Procedure and 
Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE, supra 
note 12, at 95, 95. 
54. For examples of writings that distinguish between aggregative and 
deliberative democracy, see AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELI- 
BERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 13–20 (2004); Cohen, supra note 53, at 98–99; Richard 
H. Pildes, Competitive, Deliberative, and Rights-Oriented Democracy, 3 ELEC- 
TION L. REV. 685, 685 (2004). Compare infra notes 57–58 and accompanying 
text (describing the aggregative model), with infra notes 59–64 and accompa- 
nying text (describing deliberative democracy). 
55. See JOHN S. DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND 1 
(2000) (noting that democratic theory has taken “a strong deliberative turn”); 
John S. Dryzek & Christian List, Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Deli- 
beration: A Reconciliation, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 1, 1 (2003) (“[T]he strongest 
current [of democratic theory] is now deliberative.”); Chad Flanders, Delibera- 
tive Dilemmas: A Critique of Deliberation Day from the Perspective of Election 
Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 147, 147 (2007) (“In recent years, political philosophy has 
been largely dominated by theories of deliberative democracy . . . .”); John F. 
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As its name suggests, the aggregative model treats democ- 
racy as a system for aggregating individuals’ preferences. Ag- 
gregativists take these preferences as given and discount the 
possibility that they will change.56 For an aggregativist, compe- 
tition in political forums is what drives political outcomes.57 In 
competing, political actors—including individuals, political par- 
ties, and interest groups—wheel and deal, forming strategic 
coalitions that shift over time.58 Throughout this process, how- 
ever, political players’ preferences remain unchanged. 
In contrast, deliberative democrats see reasoned debate 
among free and equal individuals as being central to democra- 
cy. During deliberation, political actors are expected to offer 
public-regarding59 reasons for their political preferences. That 
is to say, people are expected to provide reasons why their poli- 
cy positions are good not just for themselves, but for the pub- 
lic.60 These reason-giving conversations61 promote collective de- 
cisionmaking—not only in the sense that governance is “by the 
 
 
Manning, Continuity and the Legislative Design, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1863, 1880 n.65 (2004) (“Certainly, most believe that deliberation is a good 
thing, and the design of the U.S. Constitution seems to favor deliberative de- 
mocracy.”). 
56. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 13 (describing aggrega- 
tivist views); Pildes, supra note 54, at 690 (stating aggregativists’ view inter- 
ests as “fixed”). 
57. See Pildes, supra note 54, at 690 (explaining that aggregative theories 
of democracy derive from theories of competition). 
58. Ely famously referred to this system of interest-group power politics 
as the “pluralist’s bazaar.” See ELY, supra note 14, at 152. 
59. See SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, at 17 (explain- 
ing that “public-regarding” reasoning appeals to more than just private inter- 
ests). For a discussion on how public-regarding reasoning in deliberative de- 
mocracies are related to the Rawlsian concept of “public reasoning,” see 
Benhabib, supra note 53, at 74 –75. 
60. Mere articulation of opportunistic self-interest does not suffice. Politi- 
cal actors are expected to provide public policy rationales that are compelling 
to others. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 3; Benhabib, supra 
note 53, at 74 –75; Cohen, supra note 53, at 99–100. 
61. Democratic theorists often describe deliberation as a form of conversa- 
tion. See, e.g., Benhabib, supra note 53, at 70 (describing deliberation as “con- 
versation”); Cohen, supra note 53, at 99–100 (describing deliberation as “dis- 
cussion”); Flanders, supra note 55, at 147 (“The key concept for deliberative 
democrats is conversation . . . .”). Some theorists emphasize that deliberation 
includes more than literal conversations. For example, Akilah Folami empha- 
sizes hip-hop music as a form of expression important to democratic delibera- 
tion. See Akilah N. Folami, From Habermas to ‘Get Rich or Die Tryin’: Hip 
Hop, the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and the Black Public Sphere, 12 
MICH. J. RACE & L. 235, 237 (2007). 
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people,” but also “for the people.”62 Over the course of delibera- 
tion, one’s preferences might evolve because deliberation is a 
transformative process.63 Deliberating on public policy may  
lead to consensus, but it need not.64 A decision that results  
from voting after deliberation is considered the best result for 
the time being, until further deliberation leads to a better- 
reasoned outcome. 
To illustrate the differences between these two theories, 
take the case of ballot initiatives. Aggregative democrats typi- 
cally view ballot initiatives—at least as they are currently con- 
ducted—more favorably than deliberativists do.65 Deliberativ- 
ists note that there is usually too little public debate regarding 
ballot initiatives.66 Prior to voting, voters typically only hear 
sound-bite-driven media campaigns for and against such initia- 
tives.67 That dynamic lacks anything akin to the thoughtful de- 
 
62. See Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), re- 
printed in RICHARD D. HEFNER, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES 147 (Indiana Univ. Press 1952) (promoting democracy that is “of the 
people, by the people, for the people”). 
63. Social science studies confirm the transformative nature of political 
deliberation. See generally JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE 40 
(1995) (describing how deliberation changes, informs, and alters public opi- 
nion); Ethan Leib, Can Direct Democracy Be Made Deliberative?, 54 BUFF. L. 
REV. 903, 910–11 (2006) (discussing James Fishkin’s research). 
64. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 20; Pildes, supra note 
54, at 691. Some deliberativists—for example, early republican theorists and, 
more recently, Jurgen Habermas—view consensus as the end goal of delibera- 
tion. See JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 379 (2d ed. 1998); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1550 
(1988) (discussing early republicanism). 
65. See Leib, supra note 63, at 911–17 (explaining that, although most de- 
liberativists oppose ballot initiatives, ballot initiatives can be conducted in a 
manner consistent with deliberative democracy); Lawrence Gene Sager, Insu- 
lar Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City 
Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1414 (1978) (“Legislation by plebis- 
cite is not and cannot be a deliberative process. We expect and presumably de- 
rive from an initiative or referendum an expression of the aggregate will of the 
majority, or the majority of those who vote. But there is no genuine debate or 
discussion . . . .”). 
66. See Leib, supra note 63, at 908–09; Glen Staszewski, The Bait-and- 
Switch in Direct Democracy, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 17, 70. 
67. See supra note 66. One student author explains: 
Initiative campaigns generally reach the voters through advertising, 
seeking to reach a large number of people quickly and cheaply. This 
frequently results in oversimplified sound bites appealing to prejudice 
and emotions. The media-driven nature of these campaigns creates 
an environment that ‘appeal[s] to passions and prejudices, spot- 
light[s] tensions, and may foster even greater conflict and disagree- 
ment.’ [In contrast,] the legislative process includes many safeguards 
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liberation that exists in legislative houses or deliberation that 
occurs during year-long election campaigns, which usually in- 
clude debates and substantial media commentary.68 
It is worth highlighting69 some reasons why deliberative 
democracy is an appropriate aspiration for American gover- 
nance. Deliberative democracy is more desirable than aggrega- 
tive democracy because it better realizes the ideal of collective 
governance, it is entrenched in our Constitutional history, and 
it offers functional advantages over the aggregative approach. 
Compared to aggregative democracy, deliberative democra- 
cy adheres more tightly to the ideal of collective governing.70 
The aggregative model is collective in form. It tallies existing 
preferences among the collective and favors those with  the 
most support. Meanwhile, the deliberative model is collective in 
both form and content. Deliberative democracy does not only 
tally preferences, but sometimes transforms them through de- 
bate that changes people’s perspectives. Because deliberation 
can blend preferences, deliberative democracy’s outcomes bet- 
ter represent the collective.71 Furthermore, because political ac- 
tors are expected to provide public-regarding reasons in delibe- 
ration, deliberative democracy furthers not just the “by the 
people” aspect, but also the “for the people” ideal of American 
democracy.72 
In terms of historical support, Cass Sunstein, among oth- 
ers, has documented the American tradition of deliberative de- 
mocracy.73 In his writings, Sunstein draws from foundational 
documents such as the Federalist Papers to illustrate that the 
 
‘designed to encourage careful deliberation and reasoned decision- 
making’ . . . . 
Lisa B. Ross, Note, Learning the Language: An Examination of the Use of Vot- 
er Initiatives To Make Language Education Policy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1510, 
1523–24 (2007). 
68. See Ross, supra note 67. 
69. It is unfeasible to cite within these pages all the existing arguments 
for and against deliberative democracy. Among criticisms of deliberative de- 
mocracy, the most prominent is that deliberative democracy is overly lofty in 
its aspirations. For examples of such criticism, see RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, 
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 112 (2003); IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEM- 
OCRATIC THEORY 48–49 (2003); James A. Gardner, Shut Up and Vote: A Criti- 
que of Deliberative Democracy and the Life of Talk, 63 TENN. L. REV. 421, 437– 
46 (1996). For a rebuttal to these criticisms, see GUTMANN & THOMPSON, su- 
pra note 54, at 40–55. 
70. See Cohen, supra note 53, at 101. 
71. See id. 
72. See id. at 108; supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
73. See SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, at 17–39. 
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Founders sought to establish deliberative democracy.74 He also 
shows that the Founders established government structures 
such as the bicameral system to facilitate deliberation.75 
Finally, deliberative democracy is functionally superior to 
the aggregative approach in at least two regards—instrumental 
and expressive.76 In terms of instrumentality, Seyla Benhabib 
has explained that deliberative democracy generates govern- 
ment actions that are better informed77 and better reasoned.78 
Deliberative democracy also has expressive value. In a truly de- 
liberative environment, citizens express mutual respect for 
each other by engaging each other meaningfully, seeking to jus- 
tify public policy positions rather than engaging in mere power 
politics.79 
Of course, deliberative democracy is an aspirational model 
as opposed to a purely descriptive account of American gover- 
nance.80 As the example of ballot initiatives suggests, American 
 
74. See id. at 20. 
75. See id. at 23; Staszewski, supra note 66, at 70 (discussing how the 
Founders intended the governing structure to facilitate deliberation). 
76. For a general discussion of deliberative democracy’s instrumental and 
expressive values, see GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 21–23. 
77. Benhabib notes: 
[D]eliberative processes are also processes that impart information. 
New information is imparted because 1) no single individual can an- 
ticipate and foresee all the variety of perspectives through which mat- 
ters of ethics and politics would be perceived by different individuals; 
and 2) no single individual can possess all the information deemed re- 
levant to a certain decision affecting all. Deliberation is a procedure 
for being informed. 
Benhabib, supra note 53, at 71 (citations omitted). 
78. See id. (“[T]he deliberative process . . . lead[s] the individual to further 
critical reflection on his already held views and opinions . . . . More significant- 
ly, the very procedure of articulating a view in public imposes a certain reflex- 
ivity on individual preferences and opinions.”). 
79. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 22 (“[S]ignificant value 
resides in the act of justifying laws and public policies to the people who are 
bound by them. By deliberating with one another, decision-makers manifest 
mutual respect toward their fellow citizens.”); Cohen, supra note 53, at 102 
(“[P]roviding acceptable reasons for the exercise of political power to those who 
are governed by it—a requirement absent from the aggregative view— 
expresses the equal membership of all in the sovereign body responsible for 
authorizing the exercise of that power.”). 
80. See SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, at 144 (“To say 
that deliberation is required [in democracy] is only to ask how courts and oth- 
er institutions might promote that aspiration.”); Pildes, supra note 54, at 685 
(noting the aspirational nature of deliberative democracy). Some critics argue 
that deliberative democracy is an unrealistic goal. See Kirk J. Stark,  The 
Right To Vote on Taxes, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 239 nn.241–49 (2001) (listing 
citations to criticisms). 
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lawmaking is not purely deliberative.81 Laws and governing 
structures should be modified to realize deliberative democracy 
as much as possible. An ethos of deliberative democracy should 
also be instilled through, for example, public education.82 Note 
that criticisms against Hillary Clinton, for overrelying on pol- 
ling data to formulate her positions, were arguably allegations 
that she simply aggregated Americans’ preferences instead of 
reasoning her way to policy positions.83 Allegations that John 
Kerry flip-flopped, without principled reason, suggest similar 
criticism.84 To some extent, when the public rejected those two 
candidates’ alleged aggregativist tendencies, the public seemed 
to be rejecting aggregativist politics for an ethos of deliberation. 
Some critics decry deliberative democracy as an unattaina- 
ble utopia.85 Even though the country may never function pure- 
ly as a deliberative democracy, the country ought to be pushed 
closer to that ideal, reaping the benefits of improved delibera- 
tion. 
C. EFFECTS OF SCRIPTS ON DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION 
The notion of scripts forms a powerful metaphor. If delibe- 
ration in democracy is to be free and equal, the idea that deli- 
beration is scripted is troubling. This section explores those dif- 
ficulties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
81. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text. 
82. See generally Benhabib, supra note 53, at 75 (noting that Rawlsian 
“public reason” is a principle, as opposed to a process, and that deliberative 
democracy requires both principle of public reason and adequate processes for 
deliberation). 
83. See Toby Harnden, Last Stand in the Lone Star State, DAILY TELE- 
GRAPH, Feb. 16, 2008, at 19 (criticizing Clinton because “every position she 
took was tested by polling and . . . calculated”); Robert Novak, Some Clinton 
Backers Say Bill’s Aggressive Campaigning Hurt Bid, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 
23, 2007, at B7 (noting arguments that Clinton relied too heavily on polling 
data); Robert Watson, Inevitable . . . But Just Not Likeable, S. FLA. SUN- 
SENTINEL, June 29, 2008, at 5F (criticizing Clinton’s “calculated behavior” dri- 
ven by “pollsters”). 
84. See All Things Considered: How Do We Define a Political Flip-Flop? 
(National Public Radio broadcast July 10, 2008), available at 2008 WLNR 
12987165 (noting that some position changes are principled while others are 
not and noting criticism of Kerry’s changes as unprincipled). 
85. See Stark, supra note 80; supra note 69. 
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1. Barriers to Entry 
Ascribed identity scripts unreasonably limit the range of 
speakers who can climb atop platforms for political discourse.86 
Access to political power is contingent upon individuals’ negoti- 
ation of scripts corresponding to their perceived identities. 
Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati’s example of the “fifth 
black woman” helps to illustrate this dynamic, even though 
their example occurs in the employment context. In their ex- 
ample, a law firm promotes four black women, two white wom- 
en, and two white men to partnership.87 A fifth black woman is 
denied partnership. Her qualifications equal the four other 
black women’s qualifications, except she performed rather than 
rejected parts of the identity script ascribed to her.88 For in- 
stance, the fifth black woman wore dreadlocks and West Afri- 
can-inspired clothes; she was also active in African American 
interest groups and belonged to the Nation of Islam.89 By en- 
gaging in these behaviors, the fifth black woman activated neg- 
ative stereotypes about black women.90 Carbado and Gulati’s 
example illustrates how identity scripting can limit an individ- 
ual’s entry into the corporate world’s upper echelons, even if 
other members of her identity group break the glass ceiling. 
Similarly, entry into political deliberation is regulated by 
identity scripting. Consider the significance of gender scripts. 
Some commentators questioned how Sarah Palin could concur- 
rently raise young children and serve as Vice President, even 
though male candidates with young children are not similarly 
questioned.91 These critics seemed to ascribe to Palin a feminin- 
 
86. Commentators disagree on whether deliberative democracy should be 
a participatory democracy or representative democracy. See GUTMANN & 
THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 38–42. Either way, limiting the range of individ- 
uals who can climb atop political platforms stifles deliberation. 
87. See Carbado & Gulati, Fifth Black Woman, supra note 5, at 714. 
88. See id. at 728 (explaining that the fifth black woman “was denied 
partnership because she did engage in what her employer perceived to be ste- 
reotypically black female behavior”). 
89. See id. at 717–18. 
90. See id. at 728 (explaining that the “employer penaliz[ed] [the fifth 
black woman] for behavior that activated negative stereotypes”). On how ste- 
reotype-confirming behavior triggers other stereotypes in an identity script, 
see supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text. 
91. See Diana B. Carlin & Kelly L. Winfrey, Have You Come a Long Way, 
Baby? Hillary Clinton, Sarah Palin, and Sexism in 2008 Campaign Coverage, 
60 COMM. STUD. 326, 332–34 (2009); Brian Knowlton & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, 2 
Parties Struggle To Shape Running Mate’s Image, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Sept.  
4, 2008, at 6 (discussing commentary questioning Palin’s ability to juggle mo- 
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ity script that includes a portrayal of women as nurturing par- 
ents who put family commitments before professional responsi- 
bilities.92 In many regards, Palin performed parts of the femi- 
ninity script; for example, she competed in beauty pageants 
when she was younger, became a mother who served on the 
PTA, and typically opted for skirts over pantsuits.93 Critics 
seemed to connect these performances of femininity to infer 
that Palin would conform to the rest of the script by putting 
child-rearing before professional responsibility.94 In this case, 
gender scripting became a barrier to Palin’s political rise. To 
acknowledge this barrier is not to suggest that Palin’s candida- 
cy failed for this reason alone;95 nonetheless, the barrier should 
be recognized for its implications for democracy.96 
Gender scripts do not always become obstacles for women 
the way they did for Sarah Palin. For example, in a much pub- 
licized episode, Governor Ed Rendell of Pennsylvania remarked 
that Janet Napolitano, former Governor of Nevada, was the 
perfect pick for Secretary of Homeland Security because she did 
not have a family.97 Commentators construed that remark to 
 
therhood and vice presidential duties); Rick Martinez, Scrutiny Smacks of Sex- 
ism, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), Sept. 3, 2008, at A11; Peggy 
O’Crowley, To Be Mom and Veep at One Time, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ), 
Sept. 3, 2008, at 8; GOP Convention Wrap-Up – Part 2 (CNN television broad- 
cast Sept. 7, 2008), available at 2008 WLNR 16973609. 
92. For a discussion of this femininity script in the context of law firm 
employment, see supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text. For an example of 
exceptional media coverage that questioned male candidates’ ability to balance 
family life and political life, see Jodi Kantor, In 2008 Race, Little Ones Go on 
the Trail with Daddy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007, at A1. 
93. See Carlin & Winfrey, supra note 91, at 330–33; Martinez, supra note 
91. 
94. See Carlin & Winfrey, supra note 91, at 333. On the connectivity of 
stereotypes in identity scripts, see supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text. 
One might contend that Palin invited scrutiny of her work-family balance not 
because she performed feminine identity generally, but specifically because 
she prominently displayed her children on the campaign trail. See Carlin & 
Winfrey, supra note 91, at 333 (describing Palin as “a career woman who has 
children—and who displays them so prominently”). Arguably, anyone who so 
prominently displays children, regardless of gender, invites scrutiny. Carlin 
and Winfrey contend, however, that scrutiny directed at Palin nonetheless 
took a very gendered form, based on scripted expectations of mothers and fa- 
thers. See id. at 333–34. 
95. See Ann C. McGinley, Hillary Clinton, Sarah Palin, and Michelle Ob- 
ama: Performing Gender, Race, and Class on the Campaign Trail, 86 DEN. U. 
L. REV. 709, 719–21 (2009) (commenting on Palin’s shortcomings as a candi- 
date apart from her performance of gender script). 
96. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
97. See Mark Scolforo, Rendell Apologizes for Comments on Napolitano, 
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suggest that women can rise to high office, but only if they dis- 
confirm the caretaker image that is part and parcel of feminini- 
ty scripts.98 With that said, women in politics need to be careful 
not to distance themselves overly from femininity. The ideal 
female candidate walks a fine line, rejecting femininity scripts 
to appear strong, but embracing femininity enough so as not to 
appear too radical.99 
Gender scripts have also burdened male politicians. Main- 
stream media outlets admonished both John Edwards and John 
Kerry for failing to comport with masculinity scripts—Edwards 
because of his expensive haircuts, and Kerry because his de- 
meanor was “too French” and therefore overly “girlie.”100 What 
if a hypothetical male candidate for president not only had con- 
cern for his hair and a penchant for French vacations, but also 
an earring in his right ear and a very noticeable lisp? Prejudice 
against this man for breaching masculinity scripts would likely 
hinder his political career. 
Interestingly, Barack Obama was burdened by a different 
gender script: that of the hypermasculine black man who is ag- 
gressive and threatening.101 Obama’s presidential bid likely 
would not have succeeded had he not rejected that ascribed 
script by adopting a campaign tone that was unusually soft and 
reconciliatory for male politicians.102 Unlike white male politi- 
cians, Obama faced incentives to mute masculine traits.103 
 
PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 4, 2008, at B5. 
98. See Jessica Reaves, Families? They’re Just Holding Our Leaders Back, 
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 9, 2008, at 2; see also Scolforo, supra note 97. In disconfirming 
feminine caretaking stereotypes, Napolitano also warded off other parts of fe- 
mininity scripts that depict women as passive—perhaps too passive to deal 
with matters of homeland security. 
99. See McGinley, supra note 95, at 717 (using Hillary Clinton as an ex- 
ample to demonstrate that female politicians face a double bind, requiring 
them to both reject and embrace feminine stereotypes at once). 
100. See Mark Dery, Wimps, Wussies and W., L.A. TIMES, May 3, 2007, at 
A23 (discussing Edwards and Kerry); Ralph R. Reiland, ‘The Great Backlash,’ 
PITT. TRIB. REV., June 19, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 10570140 (discuss- 
ing Kerry). 
101. See Frank Rudy Cooper, Our First Unisex President? Black Masculini- 
ty and Obama’s Feminine Side, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 633, 649–59 (2009) (dis- 
cussing how Obama dealt with societal expectations of black hypermasculini- 
ty). 
102. Obama, however, did have to toe a fine line. At times during his cam- 
paign, commentators criticized Obama’s style as suggestive of weak leader- 
ship. See id. at 656. 
103. Cf. id. at 647–48 (“[T]he idealized figure of the powerful white male is 
the model for hegemonic masculinity.”). 
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These examples illuminate how identity scripts regulate 
individuals’ participation in democratic deliberation. To be 
sure, all the politicians mentioned above contributed to political 
discourse as candidates. Nonetheless, identity scripts formed 
barriers to their mounting a higher political stage that would 
enhance their deliberative power. To overcome these barriers, 
each candidate needed to negotiate the gender scripts ascribed 
to him or her. 
In this regard, identity scripts create power inequalities 
based on individuals’ ability and willingness to negotiate 
scripts, such as those based on sex and race. These power im- 
balances do not necessarily fall along traditional group demar- 
cations.104 Members of traditionally powerful groups—men, for 
example—can have their power unduly restricted by identity 
scripts.105 These power inequalities based on individuals’ abili- 
ty and willingness to negotiate ascribed identity scripts have 
disconcerting implications for democracy. 
These inequalities are troubling because a well-accepted 
precondition for democracy is that people have relatively equal 
opportunity to influence politics.106 Inequalities of deliberative 
power undermine the collective nature of democracy107 and are 
only acceptable if they are supported by public-regarding rea- 
sons.108 Historically, reasoned deliberation has suggested that 
inequalities resulting from race- and sex-based prejudice are 
 
 
104. Cf. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring 
Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 15–17 (2008) 
(suggesting that privilege is not neatly tethered to specific identity groups and 
that privilege is “conferred in more complex and particular ways” that advan- 
tage subsets of women and subsets of men). 
105. Men are often stigmatized for breaching scripts for masculinity. See 
Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: 
The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 
46–57 (1995); Nancy E. Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, 23 
WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 201, 232 (2008); Darren Rosenblum, Unsex CE- 
DAW: What’s Wrong with “Women’s Rights,” COLUM. J. GENDER & L. (forth- 
coming 2010) (manuscript at 56, on file with author); see also Onwuachi-Willig 
& Barnes, By Any Other Name, supra note 5, at 1300–01 (noting that whites 
suffer discrimination when they are regarded as black). But see Williams, su- 
pra note 10, at 11 (noting that stigma on blacks “[a]cting white” is more severe 
than that on whites who “act[ ] black”). 
106. For background on equality as a precondition of democracy, see gener- 
ally ROBERT A. DAHL, ON POLITICAL EQUALITY ix (2006) (“The existence of po- 
litical equality is a fundamental premise of democracy.”). 
107. See Benhabib, supra note 53, at 68; Cohen, supra note 53, at 106–07. 
108. See SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, at 138–45. 
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rarely justified.109 By extension, inequalities deriving from in- 
dividuals’ ability and willingness to negotiate prejudgments, in 
the form of race and gender scripts, are also presumptively un- 
justified.110 
These barriers to deliberative power limit both the instru- 
mental and expressive functions of deliberative democracy. The 
instrumental gains of collective decisionmaking are compro- 
mised because deliberation is not truly collective and the mar- 
ketplace of ideas shrinks.111 From an expressive perspective, 
hindering participation based on generally innocuous traits— 
such as motherhood112—denies respect to individuals who bear 
those traits.113 
2. Distorting Output 
Ascribed identity scripts also distort deliberation by regu- 
lating the output of communication.114 Consider Hillary Clin- 
ton’s 2008 presidential bid. Clinton needed to negotiate scripts 
that portray women as inherently weak and, therefore, unable 
to lead the country as commander-in-chief.115 Many commenta- 
tors suspect that Clinton adopted a hawkish position on the 
war in Iraq to disprove assumptions of weakness.116 
Clinton’s alleged manner of working around femininity 
scripts distorts deliberation on issues of national security. Cer- 
tainly, there may be reasons to support a hawkish approach to 
 
109. See id. 
110. In addition to Carbado and Gulati, other scholars focusing on em- 
ployment law have made similar arguments that inequalities based on per- 
formance of race and gender scripts are essentially forms for race and sex in- 
equality, respectively. See, e.g., Rich, supra note 5, at 1158–66; Robinson, 
supra note 5, at 1840–48. 
111. On the instrumental value of deliberation, see supra notes 76–78 and 
accompanying text. 
112. See supra notes 91–97 and accompanying text (discussing how mo- 
therhood can hinder female politicians). 
113. On the expressive value of deliberation, see supra notes 76, 79 and ac- 
companying text. 
114. See Carbado & Gulati, Conversations, supra note 5 (discussing a simi- 
lar dynamic in workplace conversations). 
115. See Alleen Barber, Hail to the Future Chief: Whoever She Is, NEWS- 
DAY, June 11, 2008, at A35; Liz Halloran, A Singular Achievement: Clinton 
Did Break a Glass Ceiling, Just Not the One She Hoped To, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., June 16, 2008, at 25; Jodi Kantor, Clinton Fades, but Not Her 
Impact, INT’L HERALD TRIB., May 20, 2008, at 1; Hillary Clinton To Speak at 
National Building Museum (CNN television broadcast June 7, 2008), available 
at 2008 WLNR 10932823. 
116. See supra note 115. 
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the Iraq war. However, recall that reason-giving conversations 
form the core of deliberative democracy.117 If Clinton self- 
censors reasons to reject the war or exaggerates reasons to 
support the war for the purposes of script negotiation—as op- 
posed to public-regarding purposes—then democratic delibera- 
tion is tainted. The instrumental value of deliberation is com- 
promised because the marketplace of ideas is distorted. 
Individuals who are not ascribed a femininity script are freer to 
speak against the war because they do not have the weakness 
assumption to overcome.118 
Consider also the case of Michelle Obama, who was central 
to her husband’s campaign.119 Newsweek magazine accused Mi- 
chelle Obama of toning down her support for affirmative ac- 
tion.120 Commentary in the popular press suggests that Mi- 
chelle Obama’s position change is a negotiation of identity 
scripts.121 According to many observers, Michelle Obama was 
ascribed the script of the angry black woman,122 a scripted role 
commonplace in American media.123 Commentators speculate 
that Michelle Obama rejected the script by—as the New York 
Times put it—“softening” her image and “mut[ing]” most dis- 
cussion of race.124 
Again, this Article does not suggest that there are no rea- 
sons to oppose affirmative action, just as it did not suggest that 
there are no reasons to support the Iraq war. However, taking  
a policy position to negotiate an identity script does not itself 
 
 
 
117. See supra notes 59–64 and accompanying text. 
118. See Cooper, supra note 101; cf. Carbado & Gulati, Conversations, su- 
pra note 5, at 141 (discussing “outsiders’” disproportionate burden to negotiate 
scripts); Robinson, supra note 5, at 1810–14 (same). 
119. See Richard Wolffe, Barack’s Rock, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 25, 2008, at 26, 
26–29. 
120. See id. at 26, 31 (arguing that although Michelle Obama previously 
claimed proudly that her Princeton education was a product of affirmative ac- 
tion, her office now denies any such claim, instead asserting that her applica- 
tion to Princeton benefitted from her legacy status). 
121. See infra notes 122–24 and accompanying text. 
122. See Andra Gillespie, The Michelle Obama Drama, ATLANTA J.- 
CONST., July 20, 2008, at B1; Sophia A. Nelson, Black. Female. Accomplished. 
Attacked., WASH. POST., July 20, 2008, at B1; Michael Powell & Jodi Kantor, 
After Attacks, Michelle Obama Looks for a New Introduction, N.Y. TIMES, June 
18, 2008, at A1. 
123. See, e.g., Austin, supra note 39, at 539–40. 
124. See Powell & Kantor, supra note 122. 
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qualify as public-regarding reasoning,125 which is essential to 
deliberative democracy. 
Of course, it is merely speculation that the two women, 
Clinton and Obama, strategically altered their political opi- 
nions to negotiate identity scripts. Perhaps those policy posi- 
tions seemed well-reasoned and naturally fitting to them, but 
we may never know for sure. The relevant inquiry should not 
be whether any particular individual has self-censored her 
point of view, but whether there are pressures to self-censor in 
the first place.126 As long as identity scripts generate strong in- 
centives for people to self-censor, a large question looms over 
the deliberative process. The public is left to wonder whether 
both individuals would have offered a better-reasoned policy 
position if the cloud of negotiating ascribed identity scripts did 
not loom over them.127 In this sense, the instrumental value of 
deliberation was tainted.128 
In a similar vein, President Obama seems to have muted 
his discussion of religion and race during his campaign. Al- 
though Obama self-identifies as Christian, some Americans 
perceived him as Muslim and ascribed him an identity script 
depicting Muslims as disloyal to Americans and sympathetic 
toward terrorists.129 According to many commentators, Obama 
 
125. Recall that public-regarding reasons are explanations for a policy posi- 
tion that are animated by the public’s best interests. Script negotiations do 
not, in and of themselves, serve the public interest. For example, a female pol- 
itician who takes a hawkish position to reject femininity scripts may serve her 
individual career interests, but hawkish positions are not intrinsically good for 
the public. See supra notes 59–64 and accompanying text (discussing public- 
regarding reasons). 
126. Kenji Yoshino has similarly argued that the important question is not 
whether an individual is actually “covering,” but whether there is coercive 
pressure on an individual to cover. Borrowing from sociologist Erving Goff- 
man, Yoshino uses the term “covering” to refer to the “ton[ing] down” of disfa- 
vored identity traits. See YOSHINO, supra note 4, at vii–ix, 189–91. 
127. Note that this Article does not argue that one can ascertain whether a 
sufficient or optimal level of deliberation has been achieved. Instead, this Ar- 
ticle argues that, because identity scripting so clearly compromises one’s con- 
fidence in deliberation, the law should strive to remedy identity scripting’s 
harms. Cf. Yasmin Dawood, The Antidomination Model and the Judicial Over- 
sight of Democracy, 96 GEO. L.J. 1411, 1422 (2008) (“[T]he participation model 
[of democracy] does not identify when an optimal or sufficient level of partici- 
pation has been achieved.”). 
128. On the instrumental value of deliberation, see supra notes 76–79 and 
accompanying text. 
129. See, e.g., Fakhruddin Ahmed, Op-Ed., Candidates Wrong To Snub 
Muslim Voters, TIMES (Trenton, N.J.), Aug. 1, 2008, at A9 (discussing rumors 
that Obama is Muslim and how Obama has sought to distance himself from 
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worked to reject the script; his campaign disassociated him 
from the Muslim community by refusing to make campaign 
stops at mosques (despite making stops at churches and syn- 
agogues) and by asking women in Muslim headscarves to re- 
move themselves from camera range during televised rallies.130 
The New York Times chronicled this phenomenon with an ar- 
ticle headlined “Muslim Voters Detect a Snub from Obama.”131 
After Obama was elected, he changed his approach by pub- 
licly acknowledging his Muslim family members for the first 
time since the presidential campaign.132 Obama now offers a 
strong voice arguing that Muslims need not be feared.133 If Ob- 
ama had not won the election, public discourse might have re- 
mained deprived of a high-profile advocate for improving the 
relationship between mainstream America and Muslim com- 
munities.134 To the extent that identity scripting gave Obama 
incentive to self-censor during campaign season, identity script- 
ing distorted democratic deliberation on Muslim citizenship 
and humanity. 
Obama also seemed to mute discussion of race during his 
campaign. Besides giving a speech that was prompted by criti- 
cism against Obama’s predominantly black church, Obama 
 
the Muslim community); Joseph A. Kechichian, Op-Ed., Anti-Obama Rumour 
Mill Is Working Overtime, GULF NEWS (Doha, Qatar), July 3, 2008 (same); Na- 
fees A. Syed, Op-Ed., GOP Should Accept Muslim-Americans: Quit Demoniz- 
ing This Active Political Bloc, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 14, 2008, at A13 
(same). Obama has since apologized to the two Muslim-American women who 
were removed from camera range. See Ahmed, supra. 
130. See supra note 129. 
131. See Andrea Elliott, Muslim Voters Detect a Snub from Obama, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 24, 2008, at A1. 
132. See CNN Newsroom: Obama Speaks to Muslim World; Obama Meets 
With Republican Lawmakers (CNN television broadcast Jan. 27, 2009), avail- 
able at 2009 WLNR 1636464 (discussing how Obama, for the first time since 
campaigning for President, referenced his “Muslim roots” and Muslim family 
members to reach out to Muslim communities); see also Roger Cohen, Op-Ed., 
After the War on Terror, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 29, 2009, at 8 (documenting 
that Obama acknowledged his Muslim family members and experience living 
in a Muslim country). 
133. See supra note 132. 
134. During campaign season, Colin Powell was the most high-profile lead- 
er to speak out against fears of Muslims. Powell addressed the question of Ob- 
ama’s religion, stating: “The correct answer is, he is not a Muslim, he’s a 
Christian. He’s always been a Christian. But the really right answer is, what 
if he is? Is there something wrong with being a Muslim in this country? The 
answer’s no, that’s not America.” Rachel Zoll, “Treated as Untouchables:” 
American Muslims Say They’d Been Left Out of Presidential Campaign Until 
Powell Spoke Out, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 24, 2008, at 2. 
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rarely spoke about race.135 To be clear, this lack of explicit ra- 
cial focus might not have been a result of script negotiation. In- 
deed, it is to Obama’s credit that he was able to frame issues 
important to people of color as issues important to all Ameri- 
cans. For example, Obama framed reforms to health care, pub- 
lic education, and home foreclosure policies as a rising tide that 
would lift all boats.136 A desire to develop the broader public’s 
interests in these issues may have been the primary motivation 
for his choice of issue-framing. However, some commentators 
fear that there are issues disproportionately affecting commun- 
ities of color that cannot be framed in manners avoiding expli- 
cit discussions of race, for example, the issue of race-based dis- 
parities in prison sentencing.137 If President Obama chooses not 
to engage these issues due to fears of being stereotyped—as op- 
posed to greater public policy rationales—deliberation is cer- 
tainly stymied. 
Note that it is not only pressures to conform to majorita- 
rian norms that taint deliberation. Within minority groups, 
pressure to perform in-group identity scripts138 also stifles deli- 
beration. A growing number of legal scholars have been writing 
on in-group identity scripts. For example, Russell Robinson has 
written on normative stereotypes within the black communi- 
ty.139 These normative stereotypes form an identity script that 
blacks must perform to maintain good standing within the 
 
 
135. See Justin Ewers, An Enviable Position for Civil Rights Advocates, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 1, 2008, at 27 (noting that Obama rarely 
spoke about race); James Q. Lynch, Vote Leaves Deep Impact on Blacks: Ob- 
ama’s Rise, Though, Just a Step to Equality, GAZETTE (Cedar Rapids-Iowa 
City, Iowa), Nov. 9, 2008, at 1 (quoting Prof. Angela Onwuachi-Willig on how 
Obama rarely addressed race during his campaign). 
136. I borrow this metaphor of the rising tide from Ewers, supra note 135. 
137. See Allison Samuels, Audacity of Hoping, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 2, 2009, at 
38, 38. There are signs that, although Obama limited speaking on race during 
his campaign, he is more willing to speak about race now that he is in office. 
See Earl Ofari Hutchinson, As President, Obama Vows To Address Rights, 
PHILLY.COM, Feb. 1, 2009, http://www.philly.com/philly/hp/news_update/2009 
0201_As_president Obama_vows_to_address_rights.html (noting Obama’s 
explicit commitment on his White House website to race-based civil rights). 
138. This Article uses the term “in-group identity scripts” to refer to scripts 
that individuals who claim a particular identity impose on others who they 
perceive to share that identity. For a discussion on how in-group identity 
scripts might be created by lawyers who advocate on behalf of the group, see 
Janet E. Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the Ethics of Re- 
presentation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 115, 115–18 
(David Kairys ed., 1998). 
139. See Robinson, supra note 5, at 1824 –26. 
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black community.140 For example, Robinson noted that, 
“[b]lacks who have questioned my [black] racial ‘authenticity’ 
(because I listen to ‘white music,’ for example, or perhaps be- 
cause I refused to wear a doo rag in public) have a power to cri- 
ticize me that whites lack.”141 Meanwhile, Angela Onwuachi- 
Willig has written on how intraracial marriage still constitutes 
part of people of color’s in-group identity scripts.142 
Most relevant to analyses of deliberative democracy, scho- 
lars such as Jacquelyn Bridgeman have written on the effects 
of in-group racial scripts on political discourse.143 According to 
Bridgeman, minority racial groups often pressure their group 
members to perform in-group scripts by adopting certain policy 
positions—not by reasoning persuasively regarding those posi- 
tions, but by threatening to label those who fail to comply as 
“traitor[s]” or “[s]ell-outs.”144 This ascription of an identity 
script and attendant pressure to comply stifles deliberation if 
the pressure to comply is not supported by public-regarding 
reasoning. 
This Article has mainly focused on the deliberative power 
of politicians such as Barack Obama. Theorists, however, often 
conceptualize the deliberative sphere more broadly, acknowl- 
edging the role that the media and, indeed, ordinary citizens 
play in democratic deliberation.145 Identity scripts also stymie 
the communicative output of journalists and ordinary citizens. 
For example, National Public Radio recently featured two seg- 
 
 
 
140. See id. 
141. See id. at 1825. 
142. See Onwuachi-Willig, Undercover Other, supra note 5. 
143. See generally Jacquelyn L. Bridgeman, Defining Ourselves for Our- 
selves, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1261 (2005); Michael S. Kang, Race and Demo- 
cratic Contestation, 117 YALE L.J. 734 (2008). 
144. See Bridgeman, supra note 143, at 1263–65 (criticizing members of 
black communities who “summarily reject and ostracize those within [black] 
communities who do not appear to share our views” and “wonder[ing] if we do 
not duplicate some of the patterns of silencing and marginalization that we 
ourselves constantly struggle against, when we refuse to take seriously those 
within our communities who view the world differently”); see also Kang, supra 
note 143, at 778, 781 (discussing “discursive polarization” where “[p]olitics 
may freeze along the historically dominant axis of race, removing incentives 
for political leaders to challenge the public with new choices and understand- 
ings inconsistent with the entrenched racial alignment”). 
145. See, e.g., Benhabib, supra note 53, at 75 (arguing that democratic de- 
liberation exists not only among state actors in government institutions, but 
also among citizens in their various capacities as members of civil society). 
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ments on the experiences of journalists of color.146 Numerous 
African American journalists expressed concern that they were 
being held to a higher standard, where any hint of their posi- 
tive reaction to the Obama campaign—even clapping when Ob- 
ama enters the room—would be derided as black bias inherent 
in black identity.147 This higher standard likely generates in- 
centives for black journalists to excessively self-censor. 
Ordinary citizens also negotiate identity scripts in every- 
day political conversations. Recall that female law firm asso- 
ciates have incentives to reject femininity scripts.148 According- 
ly, a female associate who engages colleagues in political 
conversation over lunch has incentives to mute stereotypically 
feminine policy positions. Racial scripts similarly limit political 
deliberation among citizens in everyday interactions. As Jody 
Armour has suggested, scripts depicting black men as hostile 
and as criminals have created a “chilling effect,” deterring 
black men from engaging other communities in civic interac- 
tions.149 To the extent that black men do engage other commun- 
ities in civic life, they may seek to negotiate stereotypes of hos- 
tility by avoiding controversial topics or positions on public 
policy. In this regard, racial scripting stifles democratic delibe- 
 
146. See Talk of the Nation: Covering Race on the Campaign Trail (Nation- 
al Public Radio broadcast Aug. 6, 2008), available at 2008 WLNR 14707535 
[hereinafter, NPR, Covering Race]; Talk of the Nation: Journalistic Guidelines 
on the Campaign Trail (National Public Radio broadcast July 30, 2008), avail- 
able at 2008 WLNR 14207260 [hereinafter NPR, Journalistic Guidelines]; see 
also Mary Mitchell, No Softballs from Minority Journalists, CHI.-SUN TIMES, 
July 28, 2008, at 3 (discussing an NPR panel on the subject of minority jour- 
nalists). 
147. See Mitchell, supra note 146 (“[A]n NPR editor asked panelists wheth- 
er it was appropriate for journalists [of color] to clap for Obama—and the 
question uncorked a mounting frustration among many black reporters.”); 
Wendi C. Thomas, Obama Challenges Journalists’ Objectivity, COM. APPEAL 
(Memphis, Tenn.), July 28, 2008, at B1 (expressing frustration that an NPR 
editor suggested that minority reporters refrain from clapping for Obama to 
convey their objectivity); NPR, Covering Race, supra note 146 (quoting Michel 
Martin, a black journalist, saying that she needs to “check[ ] herself ” in ways 
that her colleagues need not); NPR, Journalistic Guidelines, supra note 146 
(asking whether “black journalists are being held to a higher standard” and 
quoting individuals who answered in the affirmative). 
148. See Robinson, supra note 2. 
149. See Jody D. Armour, Toward a Tort-Based Theory of Civil Rights, Civ- 
il Liberties, and Racial Justice, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1469, 1476–77 (2005); see 
also Regina Waynes Joseph, New Jersey’s Issue with Race, 5 J.L. & SOC. 
CHALLENGES 33, 38 (2003) (“Racial profiling has had a chilling effect on our 
lives [in African-American communities].”); Aaron Goldstein, Note, Race, Rea- 
sonableness, and the Rule of Law, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1201 (2003) (dis- 
cussing how stereotypes create chilling effects). 
  
2010] IDENTITY SCRIPTS 927 
 
ration in everyday affairs. Because reason-giving conversations 
are central to deliberative democracy, race-based censorship 
during those conversations hampers democracy. 
3. Distorting Input 
Finally, identity scripts not only cause individuals to self- 
censor; they also warp conversations by distorting the way 
messages are received.150 These two dynamics are, of course, 
closely related. 
Consider, again, the example of Hillary Clinton and na- 
tional security. What if Clinton had rejected the Iraq war? Oth- 
ers likely would have dismissed her position, not on its merits, 
but because it was stereotypically feminine and, therefore, con- 
sidered weak.151 The very same rejection of the war is received 
differently when the speaker has not been ascribed a femininity 
script. Interestingly, the script portraying black men as hyper- 
masculine has typically been an unjustified burden on black 
men,152 but the ascription of black hypermasculinity may have 
allowed Barack Obama to speak out against the Iraq war with- 
out being dismissed as being weak—at least in contrast to Hil- 
lary Clinton.153 
Analyses of media content suggest that coverage of political 
races is often influenced by identity scripting. Reporters seem 
to focus disproportionately on the aspects of candidates that re- 
 
150. See Carbado & Gulati, Conversations, supra note 5, at 120–21. 
151. See id. (discussing a similar dynamic where feminine stereotypes dis- 
tort the way male colleagues receive communications from women in the law 
firm context). 
152. See Cooper, supra note 5, at 879 (recounting how scripts on black mas- 
culinity contributed to false convictions in the “Central Park Jogger” case); 
Kwan, supra note 38, at 1286–87 (outlining stereotypes of black men as 
hypermasculine); Russell K. Robinson, Structural Dimensions of Romantic 
Preferences, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2787, 2809 (2008) (discussing how the 
hypermasculine script affects black men’s romantic relationships); NPR News 
and Notes: Should Clinton or Obama Be First? (National Public Radio broad- 
cast Mar. 11, 2008), available at 2008 WLNR 4856463 (quoting Professor 
Kimberlé Crenshaw on the way conceptions of black masculinity hurt black 
men). 
153. Because the public often ascribes black men with so-called masculine 
traits of strength and aggression, Obama’s position on the war did not overly 
weaken the public’s perception of his strength. See Cooper, supra note 101, at 
637, 660 (noting how perceptions of black men as hypermasculine created 
some leeway for Obama to breach masculinity scripts); cf. Gloria Steinem, Op- 
Ed., Women Are Never Front-Runners, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2008, at A23 (ar- 
guing that the “masculinity-affirming” nature of black men’s identity scripts 
comforts some voters). 
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late to the candidates’ identity scripts.154 For example, even 
though female candidates announce policy positions on a varie- 
ty of subjects, their positions on so-called masculine topics are 
often overshadowed.155 Studies show that, when covering fe- 
male candidates as opposed to male candidates, journalists 
tend to focus their reporting on the women’s family lives, cloth- 
ing, and positions on so-called feminine issues.156 
This sort of biased reception of information stifles demo- 
cratic deliberation. Deliberation becomes limited because as- 
cribed identity scripts figuratively plug listeners’ ears. To be 
clear, it may sometimes be reasonable to plug one’s ears by tak- 
ing a speaker with a grain of salt. For example, it would cer- 
tainly be reasonable to take a habitual liar’s words with cau- 
tion. In such instances, however, filtering of messages is 
legitimized by credibility concerns and, therefore, distinguisha- 
ble from instances where message filtering derives from as- 
cribed identity scripts. 
4. Putting Scripts in Perspective 
The next two Parts examine how the law can help correct 
scripting’s effect on public policy and reduce the salience of 
identity scripts going forward. Before proceeding to that discus- 
sion, it is worth emphasizing that addressing identity scripts is 
not a panacea. Identity scripts certainly are not the only roots 
to problematic barriers to deliberative power, distortions of 
communicative output, and distortions of communicative input. 
For example, an individual may self-censor during political de- 
liberation for a host of reasons that are unrelated to identity 
scripts.157 Addressing the social salience of identity scripts is 
nonetheless a worthwhile project. Even though it would not 
 
 
154. Studies typically show that reporters disproportionately focus on fe- 
male candidates’ appearance and family life compared to male candidates’ ap- 
pearance and family life. Issue coverage for male candidates tends to be more 
well-balanced, while coverage for women tends to focus on feminine issues, al- 
though the issues associated with femininity seem to change over time. See, 
e.g., Dianne G. Bystrom et al., Framing the Fight, 44 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 
1999, 2001, 2011 (2001); Carlin & Winfrey, supra note 91, at 329. 
155. See supra note 154. 
156. See supra note 154. 
157. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (describing allegations that 
Hillary Clinton adopted policy positions based on group polling rather than on 
more principled reasons); see also SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 14, at 137–38 (noting that economic inequalities can create barriers to 
participation in political deliberation). 
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produce pure reason-giving conversations, it would improve the 
quality of democratic deliberation.158 
Note that reducing the power of identity scripts does not 
equate to marching toward an identityless world. It means 
heading toward a world in which identity-based expectations 
are less rigid.159 In Carbado and Gulati’s familiar employment 
hypothetical involving the African American man,160 the man 
should not need to work more hours than his peers to reject 
stereotypes of laziness. He should be able to disconfirm such 
expectations much more easily, by working just as hard and as 
well as his colleagues. Similarly, in the ideal world, Hillary 
Clinton would not have needed to adopt a hawkish position just 
to disprove stereotypes of weakness.161 She should be able to 
claim a feminine identity, but also prove her strength as easily 
as any man. Indeed, individuals should be able to claim group 
identities and tailor related identity “templates”162 without 
having to go out of their way to reject stereotypes. Because 
identities would be more malleable in this ideal world, criticism 
would not be inflicted upon individuals for merely performing 
or rejecting identity-based expectations unless there were pub- 
lic-regarding reasons for such criticism.163 
 
 
 
158. Decreasing the social salience of identity scripts would reduce barriers 
to participation in democratic deliberation, thereby improving the collective 
aspect of deliberation. Reducing identity scripts’ salience would also improve 
the quality of deliberation by mitigating incentives to self-censor and distor- 
tions in the reception of communication. For background on the dynamics of 
barriers to entry, self-censorship, and distortion in communication reception, 
see supra Parts I.C.1–3. 
159. Cf. Maxine Eichner, On Postmodern Feminist Legal Theory, 36 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 6 (2001) (arguing for an agenda that “enable[s individuals] 
to adopt more fluid notions of gender identity that are less linked to biological 
sex”). 
160. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
161. See supra notes 115–18. 
162. Recall the difference between identity scripts, which are rigid expecta- 
tions, and what I have termed identity “templates,” which are relatively ad- 
justable. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text. 
163. In this ideal world, personal identities would continue to play an im- 
portant role in political discourse. For example, a gay politician might explain 
how his experiences as a gay man—which are not representative of all other 
gay men—have shaped his values and his policy perspectives. It is important 
that the man freely articulate his own personalized gay narrative and that 
others respond to that personalized narrative as opposed to a preconceived 
script for gay identity. Other individuals should not impose scripted notions of 
gay identity that impede the hypothetical gay man’s expression of self. 
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II. NEW DIRECTIONS FOR DEMOCRACY 
REINFORCEMENT THEORY 
The effects of identity scripts should inform democracy 
reinforcement theory, which stipulates that constitutional 
rights ought to be interpreted in a manner that reinforces de- 
mocracy. This Part begins by explaining how rights can rein- 
force democracy. It then focuses on equality rights. Traditional- 
ly, democracy reinforcement theorists have argued that equal 
protection rights should ameliorate group-based hierarchies 
that undermine democracy. This Part argues that equal protec- 
tion rights should also ameliorate harmful identity scripts, 
even when they do not clearly perpetuate group-based hier- 
archy. 
A. THE REINFORCEMENT CAPACITY OF RIGHTS 
Consider this hypothetical: Congress passes a law banning 
all books; subsequently, the Supreme Court holds that the law 
violates the First Amendment’s protection of free speech. In 
this situation, has the Court trampled democracy by trumping 
elected officials’ prerogative? Arguably, the Court has not li- 
mited democracy and has, instead, supported democracy. If one 
views books as critical to democratic deliberation, then the 
Court secures a precondition to democracy by protecting 
people’s right to produce and access books. 
In this manner, protecting certain rights reinforces demo- 
cratic functioning.164 According to democracy reinforcement 
theory, this reinforcement capacity should inspire constitution- 
al interpretation.165 When the Constitution’s text is ambi- 
guous—especially if related precedents are also ambiguous— 
courts should construe constitutional rights in a fashion that 
reinforces democracy.166 John Hart Ely first trumpeted this 
theory in his still-influential book Democracy and Distrust.167 
 
164. See SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, at 142 (“Many 
rights are indispensable to . . . democratic deliberation. If we protect such 
rights through the Constitution, we do not compromise self-government at all. 
On the contrary, self-government depends for its existence on firmly protected 
democratic rights.”). 
165. See generally Thomas E. Baker, Constitutional Theory in a Nutshell, 
13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 57, 99 (2004) (providing background on “purpo- 
sivist” theories to constitutional interpretation, including democracy rein- 
forcement theory). 
166. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 14, at 101–02 (developing a “theory of judi- 
cial review” that reinforces representative democracy); SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, at 133 (“We should develop interpretive prin- 
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Returning to the First Amendment as an example, one can 
see how democracy reinforcement theory helps to clarify the 
contours of rights. Most people agree that freedom of speech is 
not absolute, but the First Amendment’s text is unclear on the 
extent of its protections.168 Democracy reinforcement theory 
helps to define those protections more specifically. 
According to democracy reinforcement rationales, the 
Court correctly divides speech into two major categories.169 On 
one hand, there is “high-value” speech, which is speech notably 
relevant to political deliberation. On the other hand, there is 
“low-value” speech, such as “fighting words,” which add very 
little to political deliberation.170 Courts properly exercise heigh- 
tened scrutiny over legislation that restricts high-value 
speech.171 Heightened scrutiny is justified because such restric- 
tions threaten democracy; courts should intensely scrutinize 
restrictions of high-value speech to ensure that there are suffi- 
cient reasons for the policies to counterweigh their threat to 
democracy.172 By limiting intense judicial review to cases con- 
cerning high-value speech, courts are careful not to override 
democracy, deferring to the political branches on matters that 
are not closely related to democratic impairment.173 
 
ciples from the goal of assuring the successful operation of a deliberative de- 
mocracy.”). 
167. ELY, supra note 14; see also Schacter, supra note 14, at 737 (“Ely’s 
classic book has helped to shape the intellectual agenda of constitutional scho- 
lars ever since it appeared.”). 
168. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2d ed. 
2003) (exploring the contours of the First Amendment). 
169. See JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 128 
(2006); SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, at 232–38. 
170. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (defining 
“fighting words” as utterances that “tend to incite an immediate breach of the 
peace” and “are no essential part of any exposition of ideas”); ELY, supra note 
14, at 114 (noting the appropriateness of the Court’s fighting words doctrine 
under democracy reinforcement theory); supra note 169. But see R.A.V. v. City 
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (holding that the state’s regulation of 
fighting words must not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint by prohibiting 
some fighting words but not others). 
171. See FLEMMING, supra note 169; SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 14, at 232–38. 
172. See FLEMMING, supra note 169; SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 14, at 232–38. 
173. Commentators have also used democracy reinforcement theory to ad- 
dress First Amendment jurisprudence beyond that concerning the two-tier 
system. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73. 80–96 
(1996) (drawing from democracy reinforcement theory to support protections of 
art as free speech); Gregory P. Magarian, The Jurisprudence of Colliding First 
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Of course, democracy reinforcement theory is not limited to 
First Amendment jurisprudence. In Democracy and Distrust, 
Ely argued that one way courts reinforce democracy is by en- 
suring that people have equal access to democratic processes 
generally.174 The right to vote is perhaps the most obvious right 
to democratic process.175 Ely viewed political speech as a demo- 
cratic process because speech is a channel for political 
change.176 Many commentators, however, believe that the most 
obvious flaw of Ely’s work was his narrow focus on process.177 
Scholars have since expanded Ely’s theory by arguing that cer- 
tain substantive rights can reinforce democracy as well.178 
The remainder of this Article focuses on how democracy 
reinforcement theory should inform equal protection jurispru- 
dence. Although defending democracy reinforcement theory 
against its alternatives is beyond this Article’s scope, it is  
worth highlighting that democracy reinforcement theory is not 
only appealing because it maintains fidelity to the Constitu- 
tion’s overarching commitment to collective governance;179 for 
 
 
Amendment Interests: From the Dead End of Neutrality to the Open Road of 
Participation-Enhancing Review, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 185, 188–89 (2007) 
(using a variation of democracy reinforcement theory to evaluate competing 
First Amendment claims). 
174. ELY, supra note 14, at 100. 
175.   See id. at 116–25. 
176.   See id. at 105–16. 
177. See, e.g., Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics: The Allure and 
Failure of Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 721, 721–23 (1991); Laurence H. 
Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 
YALE L.J. 1063, 1064 (1980); see also Jane S. Schacter, Romer v. Evans and 
Democracy’s Domain, 50 VAND. L. REV. 361, 396 (1997) (“Ely aggressively of- 
fered his theory in procedural terms and argued that it could be applied with- 
out requiring judges to make value-laden substantive distinctions that he re- 
garded as institutionally unsuited to courts. But this is exactly the point on 
which Ely has proven most vulnerable.”). 
178. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 53, at 103 (asserting that substantive li- 
berties, including religious liberty, are important to deliberative democracy); 
Jane S. Schacter, Lawrence v. Texas and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Demo- 
cratic Aspirations, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 733, 753 (2004) (positing 
that certain “social conditions” can improve democracy); David A. Strauss, 
Modernization and Representation Reinforcement: An Essay in Memory of 
John Hart Ely, 57 STAN. L. REV. 761, 769 (2004) (arguing that substantive due 
process rights can reinforce democracy); see also Magarian, supra note 173, at 
185–86 (arguing that when two claims to free speech clash, courts should 
choose between them by evaluating their substantive value to democratic deli- 
beration). 
179. See SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, at 103 (“Any 
plausible theory of constitutional interpretation must pay a great deal of at- 
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pragmatic reasons, the theory is also particularly compelling in 
the context of equal protection. 
From a pragmatic standpoint, democracy reinforcement 
theory is helpful because the other major interpretive tools are 
underdeterminate when it comes to the Equal Protection 
Clause. The Clause’s text is unclear, necessitating an interpre- 
tive principle.180 In previous writings, I have adopted a common 
law approach to constitutional interpretation,181 relying on Su- 
preme Court precedent to develop interpretive principles.182 
However, as discussed in Part III, equal protection precedent is 
sometimes unhelpfully vague in significant ways. 
Originalism, an alternative to democracy reinforcement 
theory,183 is also not very helpful in the context of equal protec- 
tion. Originalism comes in various forms, the most popular of 
which dictates that judges should interpret constitutional pro- 
visions in a manner that would be consistent with the text’s 
original meaning.184 With regard to equal protection, however, 
one original meaning is elusive, rendering originalism underde- 
 
tention to the democratic aspirations of the American constitutional tradi- 
tion.”). 
180. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (mandating that people not be de- 
nied “the equal protection of the laws”); see also ELY, supra note 14, at 30 (not- 
ing that the Amendment’s drafters consciously chose very general language); 
Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. 
COMMENT. 427, 456 (2007) (arguing that the drafters of the Equal Protection 
Clause intentionally chose vague language); Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection 
Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 958 (2002) (noting the Clause’s “inclusive” 
language). 
181. For background on the “common law approach” to constitutional in- 
terpretation, see generally David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional In- 
terpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996). But see Adrian Vermeule, Common 
Law Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1482 
(2007) (critiquing the common law approach). 
182. See Holning Lau, Formalism: From Racial Integration to Same-Sex 
Marriage, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 852–57 (2008); Lau, supra note 5, at 346–62. 
183. Although originalism and democracy reinforcement theory are consi- 
dered separate theories, they both share an interest in democracy. Originalists 
can be considered fundamentalist democracy reinforcement theorists in that 
they believe fidelity to originalism is the best way to ensure that judges do not 
undermine democracy by invalidating legislation based on their personal opi- 
nions. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, at 95. 
184. In the past, originalists generally focused on drafters’ “original inten- 
tions;” however, as that strand of analysis fell out of favor, originalists turned 
to inquiries into the “original meaning” of a text, that is to say, how the public 
would have understood the text during the time of its drafting. See, e.g., Randy 
E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 620–29 
(1999); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 
862–63 (1989). 
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terminate.185 Indeed, some legal historians have argued that 
the framers and the public originally understood the Equal 
Protection Clause to be intentionally vague, deferring specific 
definition to future generations.186 
As a result, democracy reinforcement theory is useful for 
filling the gap left behind by ambiguities in text, precedent, and 
original meaning. A final alternative approach to developing a 
gap-filler is moral philosophy,187 which can be used to clarify 
general principles—such as equality—that are enshrined in the 
Constitution.188 For current purposes, it is unnecessary to 
choose between democracy reinforcement theory and interpre- 
tive tacks grounded in moral philosophy.189 One can hypothes- 
ize that these modes of interpretation complement each other. 
This Article argues for an equal protection jurisprudence that 
combats inequalities associated with ascribed identity 
scripts;190 this proposal likely comports with both democracy 
reinforcement rationales and moral principles on equality, as 
 
 
185. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 180, at 456–57 (arguing that the Equal 
Protection Clause was understood by its contemporaries to be intentionally 
vague); Thomas B. Colby, The Federal Marriage Amendment and the False 
Promise of Originalism, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 529, 593 (2008) (same). But see, 
e.g., Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Color- 
blindness, 96 MICH. L. REV. 245, 247–48, 251 (1997) (contending that the 
Clause’s framers intended to prohibit laws that “single out any person or 
group of persons for special benefits or burdens without an adequate ‘public 
purpose’ justification” and that this intent should inform constitutional inter- 
pretation). 
186. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 180, at 456–57; see also Ronald Dworkin, 
The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1253–54 (1997). 
187. Ronald Dworkin, for example, argues that abstract constitutional text 
should be interpreted in the most morally principled manner. RONALD DWOR- 
KIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
(1996). Rights derived from moral theory may not always reinforce democracy; 
indeed, they could be viewed as constraints on democracy. See Cohen, supra 
note 53, at 97 (noting that some liberties have been considered constraints on 
the democratic process); Schacter, supra note 177, at 389 (discussing a view of 
rights as constraints on democracy). 
188. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 165, at 89–93 (providing background on 
the use of moral philosophy for constitutional interpretation). 
189. With that said, for an argument that democracy reinforcement pro- 
duces better results than constitutional perfectionism based on moral reason- 
ing, see Cass R. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2867, 2881–82 (2007) (arguing that judges are better equipped to give content 
to deliberative democracy than to more abstract ideals such as moral under- 
pinnings of rights). 
190. See infra Part III. 
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many commentators have expounded on how inequalities asso- 
ciated with script negotiations undermine human dignity.191 
B. ADDRESSING GROUP HIERARCHY 
While many rights do reinforce democracy,192 this Article 
focuses on rights to equality. The collective nature of democracy 
hinges on people’s equal opportunities to influence delibera- 
tion.193 Collective governance is undermined if significant dis- 
parities in deliberative power exist within the political  
realm.194 
Inequalities are affected by a variety of factors. Institu- 
tional design can influence deliberative inequalities. For exam- 
ple, campaign finance laws can ameliorate deliberative inequa- 
lities.195 The laws’ proponents argue that capping campaign 
expenditures levels the deliberative playing field.196 Social dy- 
namics also affect deliberative equality. Prejudice—in the form 
of outright hostility towards a social group or stereotyping— 
contributes to inequalities that stymie deliberation.197 
Before elaborating on the effects of such prejudice, it is im- 
portant to note that inequalities on some grounds may, indeed, 
be consistent with deliberative democracy. Some inequalities 
can be justified—at least provisionally—by “public-regarding” 
reasons that surface during democratic deliberation.198 The jus- 
 
191. For literature on these dignitary costs of script negotiation, see supra 
note 5. See also Christopher A. Bracey, Dignity in Race Jurisprudence, 7 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 669 (2005) (arguing that concern for dignity as a moral prin- 
ciple should drive constitutional jurisprudence, particularly race jurispru- 
dence). 
192. See supra notes 174–78 and accompanying text. 
193. See Benhabib, supra note 53, at 68; Cohen, supra note 53, at 106. 
194. Although scholars disagree on how to define this deliberative realm, it 
is arguably quite broad. Political deliberation occurs in electoral races and 
among elected officials. Some theorists argue, however, that political discourse 
also takes place in the “social sphere” of media, everyday conversations, and 
everyday encounters. See, e.g., GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 29– 
39; Benhabib, supra note 53, at 75–77; Gould, supra note 12, at 172–76; 
Schacter, supra note 177, at 398–410. 
195. See SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, at 84 –85, 223– 
24. 
196. See id. (noting such arguments but questioning whether they are em- 
pirically valid). 
197. See id. at 143. Note that this Article uses the term “prejudice” in both 
senses of the word: hostility towards a group, and preconceived ideas that may 
not be based on conscious hostility. E.g., AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 
1384 (4th ed. 2006). 
198. See SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, at 17, 352. 
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tification is provisional because further deliberation might lead 
to the conclusion that the inequalities are unjustified. 
To clarify this point, consider whether imprisoning rapists 
is consistent with deliberative democracy. Surely, incarcerated 
rapists’ deliberative power is limited because incarceration lim- 
its their ability to participate in numerous public forums. This 
inequality of power between convicted rapists and the general 
public can be consistent with deliberative democracy because 
the inequality can be supported, at least arguably, by public- 
regarding reasons. For example, one can conclude that incarce- 
rating rapists serves the public well by deterring rape, a violent 
crime.199 
In contrast to inequalities based on the status of rape of- 
fense, state-sanctioned inequalities based on grounds such as 
race and sex have often been unsupported by reasoned delibe- 
ration. Indeed, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that, his- 
torically, such inequalities have often been rooted in prejudice 
as opposed to public-regarding reason.200 The Court has ques- 
tioned the reasoning behind sex inequalities by noting that “sex 
characteristic[s] frequently bear[] no relation to ability to per- 
form or contribute to society.”201 Likewise, the Court has ques- 
tioned inequalities based on illegitimacy, race, and national 
origin because such traits “bear[] . . . no relation to the individ- 
ual’s ability to participate in and contribute to society.”202 
Among democracy reinforcement theorists, a common re- 
frain is that certain social prejudices, such as those based on 
race and sex, lead to inequalities that ought not to be tole- 
rated.203 These theorists have tended to assess how these pre- 
judice-derived inequalities stymie democracy by asking how 
prejudice contributes to group-based hierarchies. In Democracy 
and Distrust, for example, Ely discussed at length how animus 
 
199. Of course, determining how much countervailing public-regarding 
reason is necessary to justify power inequalities is a difficult question that I 
largely leave for another day. For the time being, we can acknowledge that 
there may sometimes be public-regarding reasons to justify inequalities on 
particular grounds. See id. at 238–45. 
200. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976); Frontiero v. Richard- 
son, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). 
201. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686. 
202. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 505. 
203. See ELY, supra note 14, at 153–54, 164 –70; SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CON- 
STITUTION, supra note 14, at 143–44. Note that writers have been less consis- 
tent on how far the government should go to address other inequalities, such 
as economic disparities. See SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, 
at 137–38. 
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and stereotyping directed at minority groups and women dis- 
empowered such groups, thus undermining democracy.204 Simi- 
larly, Cass Sunstein has focused on how prejudice affects inter- 
group dynamics.205 He has argued that, “[i]f a group faces ob- 
stacles to organization or pervasive prejudice or hostility,” de- 
mocracy is stilted.206 According to Sunstein, “[c]ourts should 
give close scrutiny to governmental decisions that became poss- 
ible only because certain groups face excessive barriers to exer- 
cising political influence.”207 Consequently, an “anti-caste prin- 
ciple will play a critical role in this assessment” of political 
dynamics,208 and caste manifests in the form of group-based 
subordination.209 
Such group-oriented theory has legitimized courts’ heigh- 
tened review of laws discriminating against racial minorities 
and women,210 reconciling the tension between judicial scrutiny 
and democratic rule.211 Judicial review can be undemocratic be- 
cause it allows unelected judges to override elected policymak- 
ers’ prerogative.212 However, because racial minorities and 
women have not wielded adequate influence in the political 
domain, laws discriminating against these groups may have re- 
sulted from deficient democracy.213 Therefore, when courts in- 
 
204. See ELY, supra note 14, at 153–54, 164 –70. 
205. See SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, at 143. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
209. See id. at 339 (“[In a caste system, a] social or biological difference has 
the effect of systematically subordinating the relevant group—not because of 
‘nature,’ but because of social and legal practices.”). 
210. This Article uses “heightened review” as an umbrella term referring to 
standards of judicial scrutiny that are more stringent than rational basis re- 
view. 
211. As discussed infra, in Part III.A, however, traditional democracy rein- 
forcement theory does not legitimate cases in which courts have extended 
heightened review to laws that disadvantage groups, such as white men, who 
are typically considered politically powerful. 
212. This dynamic, often referred to as the “countermajoritarian difficulty,” 
has spawned a large body of commentary. See generally Barry Friedman, The 
Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Diffi- 
culty, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002) (defining the “countermajoritarian diffi- 
culty” as “the problem of justifying the exercise of judicial review by unelected 
and ostensibly unaccountable judges in what we otherwise deem to be a politi- 
cal democracy”). 
213. See ELY, supra note 14, at 153–70 (discussing the power disadvantage 
of blacks and women); Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 151–55 (1976) (discussing the power disadvantage of 
blacks). 
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tensely scrutinized such laws, they were not overriding democ- 
racy.214 Instead, they were reviewing legislation that emerged 
from flawed democratic processes in the first place.215 Indeed, 
in many regards, equal protection jurisprudence comports with 
democracy reinforcement theory. For example, courts often 
state that it is a group’s “political powerlessness” that justifies 
heightened scrutiny of legislation concerning that group.216 
C. ADDRESSING IDENTITY SCRIPTS 
While democracy reinforcement scholars have made an in- 
valuable contribution by highlighting prejudice’s effects on de- 
mocracy, their focus on group-based hierarchy elides the fact 
that identity scripts can sometimes undermine democracy 
without clearly reinforcing group hierarchies.217 Identity scripts 
create harmful power inequalities that do not always map neat- 
ly along traditional group lines.218 Identity scripts also distort 
the reason-giving conversations that are central to deliberative 
democracy.219 
In the past, some scholars have suggested that identity 
scripting is problematic, even if it does not reinforce group- 
based subordination. For example, feminists such as Sylvia 
Law and Mary Anne Case have long argued that gender script- 
 
 
214. See Schacter, supra note 177, at 391. 
215. Id. (“Seen in these terms, equality-enhancing judicial review enables 
democracy rather than applies a brake on it.”). 
216. See generally WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 1006–11 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing the “political powerless- 
ness” criterion for “suspect status”). Note, however, that the Supreme Court 
has sometimes extended heightened review to laws disadvantaging social 
groups that are typically considered powerful—for example, white men. See 
infra Part III.A. 
217. Democracy reinforcement theorists who focus on groups are not li- 
mited to Ely and Sunstein. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, The Logic of Majority 
Rule, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 23, 30–45 (2006); Schacter, supra note 177, at 362. 
These theorists disagree on how deeply to look for inequality, but they all 
share the commonality of group-oriented analysis. 
218. Consider the fifth black woman hypothetical, supra Part I.C.1, which 
illustrates that identity scripting can create troubling inequalities within an 
identity group, such as those between the fifth black woman and other black 
women who successfully negotiated their identity script. Carbado & Gulati, 
Fifth Black Woman, supra note 5, at 714 –19. Also consider how gender scripts 
do not simply empower men while subordinating women. Gender scripts dis- 
empower men, women, and transgender individuals whose gender perfor- 
mances do not conform to social expectations. See supra Part I.C.1. 
219. See supra Parts I.C.2–3. 
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ing is harmful regardless of its group-based effects.220 Reacting 
to laws that codify stereotypes, Law has argued that the gov- 
ernment should protect “each person’s authority to define her- 
self or himself, free from sex-defined legal constraints.”221 Simi- 
larly, Case has argued that “‘fixed notions concerning the roles 
and abilities of males and females’ are problematic when em- 
bedded in law, even in law that does not in any articulable way 
subordinate women to men.”222 
This Article buttresses claims like those of Law and Case 
by demonstrating how identity scripts create harms to demo- 
cratic deliberation, even if they do not reinforce group-based 
hierarchy. This insight provides new directions for democracy 
reinforcement theory. Script-oriented democracy reinforcement 
theory supports the idea that courts should interpret equality 
rights in a manner that addresses harmful identity scripts in 
addition to interpreting equality rights to address group-based 
hierarchy. Equal protection jurisprudence ought to correct for 
laws resulting from script-based deliberative impairments and 
to reduce the salience of harmful identity scripts. Part III ap- 
plies this vision of democracy reinforcement to four areas of 
equal protection doctrine. 
 
III. TAILORING DOCTRINE ACCORDING TO SCRIPT- 
ORIENTED THEORY 
In equal protection doctrine, as in other areas of constitu- 
tional jurisprudence, courts subject some laws to rational basis 
review and other laws to heightened scrutiny. Script-oriented 
democracy reinforcement theory helps to determine which laws 
warrant heightened scrutiny. It also helps to define the para- 
meters of heightened judicial review. 
Recall that democracy reinforcement theory justifies heigh- 
tened review of laws that either cause, or are effects of, demo- 
cratic impairment. Heightened review of laws that cause demo- 
cratic impairment reinforces democracy because heightened 
review of such laws can improve democratic function.223 When 
judges exercise heightened review of laws that are the effects of 
democratic impairment, judges are not trumping democracy, 
 
220. See Case, supra note 33, at 1473; Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and 
the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 969 (1984). 
221. Law, supra note 220, at 969. 
222. Case, supra note 33, at 1473 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Ho- 
gan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982)). 
223. See supra notes 171–73 and accompanying text. 
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but are correcting for laws that flowed from flawed democratic 
processes in the first place.224 
Accordingly, this Part examines how equal protection juris- 
prudence should apply heightened review to laws that risk per- 
petuating, or are the effects of, script-related democratic im- 
pairments. Specifically, this Part examines four areas of equal 
protection jurisprudence: the question of how to determine 
whether a status is suspect, the sex discrimination argument 
for same-sex marriage, the topic of racial integration in public 
schools, and the topic of racial and religious profiling. 
To be clear, this Article uses the phrase “heightened scru- 
tiny” as an umbrella term referring to judicial review that is 
more stringent than rational basis review.225 When reviewing a 
 
224. See supra notes 210–16 and accompanying text; see also SUNSTEIN, 
PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, at 143 (“Courts should give close scru- 
tiny to governmental decisions that became possible only because certain 
groups face excessive barriers to exercising political influence. Such scrutiny is 
justified in the interest of democracy itself.”). 
Of course, deliberation tainted by identity scripting possibly affects many 
laws. For example, recall that gender scripting’s effects span so broadly that 
they taint even deliberation on national security. See supra notes 116–18 and 
accompanying text. Judicial power would stretch too far if courts were allowed 
to exercise heightened scrutiny over every policy that is tainted by identity 
scripting. The breadth of heightened review would swallow up rational basis 
review entirely, damaging the balance between legislative and judicial power. 
Insofar as the following sections are concerned with laws that are the effects of 
flawed deliberation, they will focus on laws that share a relatively tight nexus 
with identity scripting. 
225. Rational basis review merely ensures that a law is rationally related 
to a legitimate government interest. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTI- 
TUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLITICS 651–63 (2d ed. 2002). 
Currently, the two main forms of heightened scrutiny are strict scrutiny 
and intermediate scrutiny. See id. at 668–69, 721–28 (summarizing caselaw 
involving heightened scrutiny). Strict scrutiny requires that the discrimina- 
tion be necessary or “narrowly tailored” to achieve “compelling” government 
interests. See id. at 668–69. Intermediate scrutiny requires that discrimina- 
tion be “substantially related” to “important” government interests. See id. at 
721–28. In both of these inquiries—in contrast to rational basis review—courts 
consider whether a law’s discrimination is underinclusive or overinclusive 
with regard to achieving government interests. See id. at 668–69, 721–28; see 
also Lau, supra note 182, at 865–66. In this regard, heightened scrutiny inter- 
rogates the fitness of means and ends. See Holning Lau, Sexual Orientation & 
Gender Identity: American Law in Light of East Asian Developments, 31 HARV. 
J.L. & GENDER 67, 86 n.110 (2008) (discussing rational basis review’s lack of a 
fitness requirement). 
Sometimes, under rational basis review, courts scrutinize laws to see if 
they are driven purely by animus. Commentators have differentiated this type 
of review from traditional rational basis review, calling it “rational basis with 
bite.” See id. Even rational basis with bite, however, lacks a test for fitness. So 
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law that implicates identity scripting, courts should apply more 
than rational basis review. First, they should demand that gov- 
ernment interests be more than just legitimate. The interests 
should be significant enough to counterweigh harms associated 
with identity scripting. Second, courts should require the state 
to do more than merely show the law is rationally related to 
government goals. The state should demonstrate fitness be- 
tween the law and the government’s stated ends. These two 
prongs are common features among the existing variants of 
heightened review. This Article stops short of prescribing a 
specific formula for heightened review because that project 
warrants a separate discussion.226 With that said, this Part of- 
fers some preliminary thoughts on how a law’s relationship to 
identity scripting should inform heightened review of that law. 
A. DEFINING SUSPECT STATUS 
Current equal protection doctrine dictates that only dis- 
crimination based on certain statuses trigger heightened scru- 
tiny.227 For economy of language, this Article refers to these 
particular grounds as “suspect statuses,” even though courts 
sometimes divide these statuses into two subcategories: suspect 
and quasi-suspect.228 Democracy reinforcement theory provides 
guidance on how to determine whether a status is suspect. This 
question has garnered much attention recently, as state courts 
wrestle with whether sexual orientation is a suspect status in 
same-sex marriage litigation.229 Recent discourse on the Obama 
 
 
 
long as a law is not purely motivated by animus, the law is valid regardless of 
whether its means are proportionate to the legitimate ends sought. See id. 
226. In previous writing, I have tentatively endorsed a singular proportio- 
nality test for heightened scrutiny. See Lau, supra note 182, at 852, 872–73 
(rejecting heightened scrutiny that is “fatal in fact”); Lau, supra note 225 (dis- 
cussing proportionality review); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Being Proportional 
about Proportionality, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 803, 806–07 (2003) (discussing 
the various proportionality tests used in foreign courts). A careful analysis of 
the strengths and weaknesses of alternatives to the present forms of heigh- 
tened scrutiny warrants its own article. 
227. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 225, at 668–69, 721–28. 
228. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 
481, 485 (2004); see also Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Scope of the Second Amend- 
ment Right—Post-Heller Standard of Review, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 43, 47 (2009). 
229. See Edward Stein, Marriage or Liberation?: Reflections on Two Strate- 
gies in the Struggle for Lesbian and Gay Rights and Relationship Recognition, 
61 RUTGERS L. REV. 567, 580 nn.69–72 (2009) (listing cases that have ad- 
dressed whether sexual orientation is a suspect status). 
  
942 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [94:897 
 
presidency marking a post-racial era also prompts questions 
regarding whether race is still suspect.230 
In discussing suspect statuses, the Supreme Court has re- 
ferred to both “suspect classes” and “suspect classifications.”231 
For example, at times, the Court has suggested that blacks are 
a suspect class; other times, it has suggested that race is a sus- 
pect classification.232 It typically refers to suspect classes and 
suspect classifications interchangeably, blurring distinctions 
between the two concepts.233 From the viewpoint of democracy 
reinforcement theory, the Court’s entanglement of class and 
classification is misguided. 
This entanglement of class and classification is apparent 
when considering how to determine whether a status is sus- 
pect. Although the Court has not explicitly delineated a test for 
suspectness,234 lower courts have generally read Supreme  
Court jurisprudence to produce the following list of factors for 
consideration: (1) whether the status refers to a group that has 
suffered a history of purposeful discrimination; (2) whether the 
group is politically powerless; (3) whether the status is based 
on a trait that is irrelevant to individuals’ ability to contribute 
to society; and (4) the immutability of the trait.235 Some factors 
focus on status as a class (i.e., group status) while the other fac- 
tors treat status as a classification basis. Lower courts have 
disagreed on how these various factors interact.236 
 
230. For a discussion of Barack Obama’s “post-racial” politics, see, for ex- 
ample, Matt Bai, Post-Race, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2008, at M34; Dawn Turner 
Trice, Nomination No End to Civil Rights Dream, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 29, 2008,  
at 4. 
231. MURPHY ET AL., supra note 216, at 1005. 
232. Id. 
233. See id. (“There is an important conceptual difference between ‘suspect 
classifications’ and ‘suspect classes.’ Members of the Supreme Court tend to 
use the terms interchangeably and so confuse their own as well as others’ ana- 
lyses.”); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1487 (8th ed. 2004) (defining sus- 
pect class as “[a] group identified or defined in a suspect classification”). 
234. See MURPHY ET AL., supra note 216, at 1010 (summarizing Supreme 
Court jurisprudence and concluding that, “[i]n sum, there is no short answer” 
to defining suspect classes or suspect classifications). 
235. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 225, at 645–47; see also Paul Ades, The 
Unconstitutionality of “Antihomeless” Law, 77 CAL. L. REV. 594, 624 n.209 
(1989). 
236. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 228, at 503–04 (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s inconsistent application of the factors); Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The 
Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court Should Recognize 
Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classes Based on Sexual Orientation, 
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2785–804 (2005) (discussing courts’ inconsistent 
application of the factors). 
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To further examine how the Supreme Court has entangled 
class and classification, consider the Court’s sex discrimination 
jurisprudence. The Court has asserted that sex is a quasi- 
suspect classification.237 To support that assertion, it has cited 
the fact that women have historically suffered discrimination 
and political disempowerment.238 In doing so, the court has en- 
tangled class and classification. It is unclear why determining 
that women are a suspect class (i.e., a suspect group status) 
leads to the conclusion that sex is a suspect basis of classifica- 
tion. Women’s experience with discrimination and political po- 
werlessness says very little about why sex classifications that 
disadvantage men should trigger heightened scrutiny. Yet, the 
Court has indeed applied heightened review to laws that disad- 
vantage men—even though men have neither been politically 
disempowered as a group nor suffered a history of discrimina- 
tion.239 
Democracy reinforcement theory suggests that class and 
classification should be disentangled. There should be two sep- 
arate, coexisting tests for suspect status: one clearly focusing 
on classes and another clearly focusing on classifications. The 
former is based on traditional group-oriented theory while the 
latter is animated by a script-oriented approach. 
A class of persons should be considered suspect if it suffers 
significant power impairment and has suffered a history of 
group-directed prejudice. In these cases, the group at stake has 
insufficient power to influence political deliberation and history 
suggests that the power deficit results from prejudice as op- 
posed to public-regarding reason. Laws that single out such 
groups warrant heightened scrutiny both because they likely 
stem from flawed deliberation and because they may have the 
effect of entrenching the group’s powerlessness.240 
 
 
 
 
237. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
238. See id.; see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 n.17 (1973) 
(plurality opinion) (arguing that sex should be a suspect status). 
239. For example, in Craig v. Boren, the Supreme Court applied interme- 
diate scrutiny to a law permitting women over the age of eighteen to buy beer, 
but requiring men to be twenty-one to make the same purchase. See 429 U.S. 
at 218 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In applying intermediate scrutiny, the 
Court questioned whether that law was animated by gender stereotypes. See 
id. at 197–99. 
240. See SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, at 143. 
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Whether the group is defined by an immutable trait should 
be irrelevant.241 Originally, jurists posited that groups defined 
by an immutable trait were particularly vulnerable to political 
disempowerment.242 Recent scholarship has retired that theory 
by pointing to examples of how immutability is a poor proxy for 
political disempowerment.243 For example, aliens and religious 
minorities are often politically impaired despite the fact that 
citizenship and religion are changeable.244 In practice then, the 
group-oriented approach justifies treating groups such as aliens 
as a suspect class. Aliens satisfy the group-oriented approach’s 
two criteria for suspectness because they are politically disem- 
powered and historically have been the target of group-based 
prejudice. Religious groups that share those qualities would be 
similarly suspect. 
Turning to script-oriented theory, a classification scheme 
should be suspect if it is grounded on a trait that is currently 
and has historically been the basis of identity scripting, and if 
the trait is not indicative of persons’ ability to contribute to so- 
ciety. Laws based on such classifications warrant heightened 
scrutiny because there is a risk that they stemmed from script- 
tainted deliberation and will entrench script attribution based 
on the associated trait.245 
It is worth emphasizing that this new, script-oriented test 
for suspect classifications preserves two important limiting me- 
 
 
241. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442 (Cal. 2008) (refusing 
to make immutability a requirement for suspect status); Tanner v. Or. Health 
Sci. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 522–23 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (same); Bruce A. Acker- 
man, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 728–31 (1985) (criticiz- 
ing the immutability factor); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on 
Grounds Other than Race”: The Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in 
Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 694 –96 (2008) 
(same); Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility 
Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 489– 
90, 509–19 (1998) (same). 
242. See Hutchinson, supra note 241, at 694 (“[T]he theory behind immu- 
tability posits that maltreatment on the basis of a ‘biological’ and immutable 
trait is particularly disabling [politically] . . . .”). 
243. See id. at 694 –96 (summarizing scholarship). 
244. Cf. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 442 (noting that religion and 
alienage are regarded as suspect statuses even though they are not immuta- 
ble). 
245. If a trait is tethered to identity scripts, deliberation related to that 
trait will likely implicate related scripts because the trait and the scripts 
share a nexus. For discussion on how classifications based on a particular trait 
can entrench scripting related to that trait, see infra note 295 and accompany- 
ing text. 
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chanisms. First, the test requires that the trait at hand not be 
significantly indicative of an individual’s ability to contribute to 
society. Legislatures likely have public-regarding reasons to 
classify people by traits that bear such significance. Therefore, 
such classifications do not presumptively implicate a democrat- 
ic impairment justifying heightened scrutiny. For example, age 
affects a person’s ability to contribute to society.246 As a result, 
age-differentiating laws, such as those limiting the autonomy of 
minors, should not automatically trigger heightened scruti- 
ny.247 
The test’s second screening criterion is history. There are 
indeed many bases for identity scripting, but those bases are 
not equally problematic.248 Social scientists acknowledge that 
stereotypes based on some categories are applied more auto- 
matically and thus are more difficult to negate than other ste- 
reotypes. This is because certain categories are socially con- 
structed as being particularly salient.249 For example, 
mainstream society may impose strings of stereotypes on law- 
yers. However, a script for lawyers is distinguishable from ra- 
cial scripts. History is a proxy for categories’ salience. It is the 
repeated use of certain stereotypes—for example, stereotyping 
based on race, sex, and sexual orientation—throughout history 
that renders them deeply etched in the public’s collective 
psyche.250 During democratic deliberation, individuals must go 
 
246. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 –15 (1976). 
247. See generally MARTIN R. GARDNER & ANNE PROFFITT DUPRE, CHILD- 
REN AND THE LAW 1–28 (2d ed. 2006) (providing background on the matura- 
tion process and legal personhood of minors). 
248. See Ashleigh Shelby Rosette & Tracy L. Dumas, The Hair Dilemma: 
Conform to Mainstream Expectations or Emphasize Racial Identity, 14 DUKE 
J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 407, 419 (2007) (“Identity theorists have historically ar- 
gued that these multiple components of the self are differentially weighted, 
such that some aspects are more important or salient than others.” (citing Pe- 
ter L. Callero, Role-Identity Salience, 48 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 203, 203 (1985))). 
249. Jacquelyn L. Bridgeman, Seeing the Old Lady: A New Perspective on 
the Age Old Problems of Discrimination, Inequality, and Subordination, 27 
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 263, 317 (2006) (“[S]cientists have shown that some of 
the categories, such as race, with which we invest so much meaning are so- 
cial constructs deriving their salience through repeated use and context.” (cit- 
ing Don Operario & Susan T. Fiske, Racism Equals Power Plus Prejudice: A 
Social Psychological Equation for Racial Oppression, in CONFRONTING RACISM 
(Jennifer Eberhardt & Susan T. Fiske eds., 1998))); see also Krieger, supra 
note 23, at 1201–02 (citing social and cultural context as a determinant of so- 
cial categories’ salience); Eric J. Mitnick, Law, Cognition, and Identity, 67 LA. 
L. REV. 823, 852 (2007) (highlighting the significance of power relations, cul- 
tural norms, and history in the construction of social categories). 
250. See supra note 249. 
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to great lengths to work around these deeply entrenched ste- 
reotypes. Therefore, stereotyping on historically salient catego- 
ries is particularly problematic to deliberative democracy and it 
is those categories that should be suspect.251 
One might argue that courts are not capable of determin- 
ing whether stereotypes are historically entrenched. In prac- 
tice, however, courts already engage in this inquiry. Courts al- 
ready consider “history of discrimination” as a criterion of 
suspect status,252 and discussions of stereotypes are common to 
that inquiry.253 One way for courts to assess the historical sa- 
 
251. Although there is no bright line separating historically entrenched so- 
cial categories from other categories, stark differences among categories are 
readily apparent. For example, significant literature documents how racial 
stereotypes have a history of informing public policies. There is also significant 
social science literature on the particular salience of race as a social category. 
See Krieger, supra note 23, at 1201–02 (reviewing relevant laws and litera- 
ture). In contrast, one is hard-pressed to find comparable bodies of literature 
regarding stereotypes of lawyers. 
252. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 225, at 646. 
253. Most recently, courts have examined the history of sexual orientation 
stereotyping to analyze whether sexual orientation is a suspect status. See, 
e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 444 (Cal. 2008) (concluding that sex- 
ual orientation “has been the basis for biased and improperly stereotypical 
treatment”); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 472–75 (Conn. 
2008) (discussing stereotyping of same-sex couples); Conaway v. Deane, 932 
A.2d 571, 609–16 (Md. 2007) (discussing the history of stereotyping homosex- 
uals and heterosexuals); see also Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 
N.E.2d 941, 962 (Mass. 2003) (discussing “the destructive stereotype that 
same-sex relationships are inherently unstable and inferior to opposite-sex 
relationships,” even though the court did not engage in this inquiry for the 
purposes of ascertaining suspectness). Note that stereotypes based on sexual 
orientation do not only concern homosexual or bisexual identities. Those ste- 
reotypes contrast with the normative stereotypes that form scripts for hetero- 
sexuality. See A. Jean Thomas, The Hard Edge of Kulturkampf: Cultural Vi- 
olence, Political Backlashes and Judicial Resistance to Lawrence and Brown, 
23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 707, 727, 730 (2004) (arguing that children learn to 
“perform heterosexuality” scripts and suggesting that limiting marriage to op- 
posite-sex couples preserves marriage as a “heterosexuality factory” (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Indeed, courts have a history of adeptly identifying and condemning ste- 
reotypes. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 –85 (1973), Justice 
Brennan famously acknowledged that sex stereotypes—for example, expecta- 
tions that women are timid and fragile—have wrongly animated legislation 
and court opinions in the past. In subsequent decisions, the Court has readily 
acknowledged that sex stereotyping has animated legislation. See, e.g., J.E.B. 
v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130–31 (1994) (noting that the policy in 
question “serve[d] to ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad 
stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and women”); see also Case, su- 
pra note 33, at 1449 (discussing the prevalence of antistereotyping reasoning 
in sex discrimination jurisprudence). 
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lience of identity scripts is to look at whether stereotypes based 
on a particular trait have historically animated lawmaking.254 
Indeed, this Article bifurcates the existing criteria for sus- 
pectness into two tests: one focused on class and another fo- 
cused on classification. Notably, it does not require courts to do 
more than they are already doing. To clarify the difference be- 
tween the group-oriented and script-oriented approaches to 
suspect status, consider the example of sexual orientation. The 
Washington Supreme Court, for example, stated that the gay 
community is not a suspect class, reasoning that the communi- 
ty is politically powerful because Washington State has openly 
gay elected officials and the state legislature had yielded to the 
gay community’s push for antidiscrimination legislation.255 
Assuming arguendo that the gay community does have 
significant political power, the group-oriented approach would 
dictate that gays and lesbians do not constitute a suspect class. 
Under a script-oriented approach, however, sexual orientation 
would still be a suspect classification. The Supreme Court of 
California seems to have taken this approach, although it has 
not said so explicitly. In a same-sex marriage case, the Su- 
preme Court of California stated that “courts must look closely 
at classifications based on [suspect] characteristic[s] lest out- 
 
Similarly, the Supreme Court has often identified and condemned racial 
stereotypes in dicta. See Leonard M. Baynes, White Out: The Absence and Ste- 
reotyping of People of Color by the Broadcast Networks in Prime Time Enter- 
tainment Programming, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 293, 304 –07 (2003) (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of racial stereotyping and citing Miller v. Johnson, 
515 U.S. 900, 913, 919–20 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646–48 (1993); 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 614, 628, 630–31 (1991); 
Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602–05 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissent- 
ing); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 n.2 (1990); City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954)). 
254. Courts and commentators have examined how stereotypes based on 
sex, race, and sexual orientation have historically informed lawmaking. See 
supra note 253; see also Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684 –86 (acknowledging a histo- 
ry during which “statute books gradually became laden with gross, stereo- 
typed distinctions between the sexes”); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: 
CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 13–97 (1999) (examining his- 
torical laws animated by sexual orientation stereotypes); Krieger, supra note 
23, at 1201–02 (noting historical laws informed by racial stereotypes). 
255. See Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 974 –75 (Wash. 2006) 
(“[A]s a class gay and lesbian persons are not powerless but, instead, exercise 
increasing political power.”). It should be noted that the Washington Supreme 
Court also based its reasoning, in part, on its not being persuaded that sexual 
orientation is immutable. See id. at 974 (“[P]laintiffs must make a showing 
[that homosexuality is immutable], and they have not done so in this case.”). 
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dated social stereotypes result in invidious laws or practices.”256 
The court suggested that sexual orientation is a suspect status 
because—both historically and in more recent times—people 
have been stereotyped based on sexual orientation, even though 
sexual orientation is a trait that generally has no relationship 
to individuals’ capacity to contribute to society.257 Importantly, 
the court refused to consider whether gays and lesbians are a 
politically powerless group, deeming that question irrele- 
vant.258 
The Supreme Court of California’s approach indeed com- 
ports with democratic reinforcement ideals. Even if gays and 
lesbians are politically powerful according to some measures 
such as the election of openly gay legislators, deliberation on 
issues such as same-sex marriage can still be stymied by deeply 
rooted sexual orientation-based stereotyping.259 If stereotyping 
does pose this threat, sexual orientation should be considered a 
suspect classification. 
 
 
256. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 443 (quoting Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kir- 
by, 485 P.2d 529, 540 (Cal. 1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
257. See id. at 443 (noting that one of the “most important factors in decid- 
ing whether a characteristic should be considered a constitutionally suspect 
basis for classification” is “whether society now recognizes that the characte- 
ristic in question generally bears no relationship to the individual’s ability to 
perform or contribute to society”). The court also did engage in a class-oriented 
analysis; in addition to concluding that “statutory classifications . . . on the ba- 
sis of sexual orientation” are suspect, the court expressed concern that gays 
and lesbians constitute a “class of persons who exhibit a certain characteristic 
[which] historically has been subjected to invidious and prejudicial treatment.” 
Id. 
258. See id. (“[O]ur cases have not identified a group’s current political po- 
werlessness as a necessary prerequisite for treatment as a suspect class.” (em- 
phasis omitted)). 
259. Recent scholarship suggests that, even though gays and lesbians are 
subject to decreasing levels of animus from mainstream society, they are still 
stereotyped in certain regards; for example, gays and lesbians are often stereo- 
typed as unable to raise healthy children despite the overwhelming social 
science evidence that disproves that stereotype. See Richard E. Redding, It’s 
Really About Sex: Same-Sex Marriage, Lesbigay Parenting, and the Psychology 
of Disgust, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 127, 134 –45, 159, 172, 191 (2008) 
(discussing stereotypes of gay and lesbian parents that lead to a “politics of 
disgust” against them, even though the stereotypes lack empirical support); 
Clifford J. Rosky, Like Father, Like Son: Homosexuality, Parenthood, and the 
Gender of Homophobia, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 257, 279–311 (2009) (dis- 
cussing stereotypes regarding gay and lesbian parents); Judith Stacey & Ti- 
mothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter?, 66 
AM. SOC. REV. 159, 164 –67 (2001) (reviewing social science literature on gay 
and lesbian parents). 
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Note that this bifurcated approach to suspect status pre- 
serves race and sex as suspect statuses, despite recent political 
developments. The ascent of individuals such as Barack Ob- 
ama, Hillary Clinton, and Sarah Palin has prompted some 
commentators to note that political glass ceilings have crum- 
bled or, at least, are cracking.260 The 2008 election year begs 
the question: with these glass ceilings falling, do women or 
blacks continue to have a power impairment justifying courts’ 
intense scrutiny of laws based on sex or race?261 Based on tradi- 
tional democracy reinforcement theory, the answer is arguably 
unclear. Traditional democracy reinforcement theorists address 
power through a group-based paradigm,262 but it is unclear to 
what extent electing a female or black president—or any num- 
ber of government officials, for that matter—would signal that 
 
260. See, e.g., Peter Baker & Jim Rutenberg, The Long Road to a Clinton 
Exit, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2008, at A1 (quoting Hillary Clinton in thanking her 
supporters for “crack[ing]” the glass ceiling); DeNeen L. Brown, Two Words 
with a Ring of Possibility, WASH. POST, June 4, 2008, at C1 (calling an Obama 
victory “symboli[c of] the smashing of a glass ceiling”); Editorial, Despite Push, 
Obama Needn’t Rush VP Pick, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 5, 2008, at A16 
(arguing that by winning the Democratic primary, Obama “burst through a 
still-thick, race-based glass ceiling in American politics”); Scott Martelle, Ohio 
Voters’ Love Is Tough To Win, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2008, at 13 (describing the 
Democratic primary as “destined to break one of two glass ceilings—gender or 
race”); Adam Nagourney, Obama: Racial Barrier Falls in Decisive Victory, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at A1 (describing Obama’s victory as “sweeping 
away the last racial barrier in American politics”). 
261. Cf. Jodi Kantor, Teaching Law, Testing Ideas, Obama Stood Slightly 
Apart, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2008, at A1 (stating that “whether Americans will 
elect a black president” may be the “ultimate test of racial equality”). A related 
question is whether individuals who are both female and black continue to 
have a power impairment. For a discussion of “intersectional” groups such as 
black women, see supra Part I.A. 
Recall that courts usually justify heightened scrutiny of laws affecting a 
particular group by highlighting the group’s “political powerlessness.” See su- 
pra note 216 and accompanying text. 
262. Theorists typically analyze prejudice against groups and political un- 
derrepresentation of groups to determine the extent to which a democratic def- 
icit exists. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 14, at 103 (arguing that the democratic 
process “malfunction[s]” both when “the ins are choking off the channels of po- 
litical change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out” and 
when “representatives beholden to an effective majority are systematically 
disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to 
recognize commonalities of interest”); SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, su- 
pra note 14, at 339 (analyzing the problem of race and sex discrimination in 
democracy); Brown, supra note 217, at 36–38 (discussing the Constitution’s 
requirements for minority group representation); Schacter, supra note 177, at 
400 (“[S]ocial disenfranchisement corrodes the fairness of the political process 
by selectively hampering the ability of gay citizens and groups to achieve or 
influence preferred political outcomes.”). 
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women or blacks are empowered as groups. It is difficult to as- 
sess whether any given individual represents a particular so- 
cial group’s interests.263 Individuals who supposedly belong to a 
particular demographic group may fail to represent their 
group’s collective interests.264 Some courts suggest that politi- 
cal power can be assessed by counting heads in high elected of- 
fice.265 This method generates nebulous results.266 As a thre- 
shold matter, it is unclear how to delineate group membership 
for counting purposes. (Should Barack Obama, a man with a 
white mother, be considered black?)267 Moreover, it is unclear 
who legitimately represents a particular group.268 (Does Sarah 
Palin represent all women?)269 
 
263. See Gould, supra note 12, at 184 (noting the possibility that some men 
may represent women’s interests better than some women might). 
264. Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati have addressed this dynamic in 
workplaces, arguing that racial minorities who climb to the top of the corpo- 
rate ladder tend not to represent the interests of their fellow minorities at the 
foot of the ladder. See Carbado & Gulati, Race to the Top, supra note 5, at 1646 
(“[S]trong incentives exist for minorities to race to the top of the corporation 
and lift the ladder up behind them when they  get  there.”);  see  also  infra 
note 269. 
265. See, e.g., Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 974 (Wash. 2006) 
(reasoning that gays and lesbians are not politically powerless in part because 
“a number of openly gay candidates [have been] elected to national, state and 
local offices”). 
266. Some courts note “the lack of a mathematical equation to guide the 
analysis of [political powerlessness].” Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 894 
(Iowa 2009) (addressing political powerlessness in same-sex marriage litiga- 
tion). According to the high courts of Iowa and Connecticut, “the touchstone of 
the analysis should be ‘whether the group lacks sufficient political strength to 
bring a prompt end to . . . prejudice and discrimination through traditional po- 
litical means.’” Id. (quoting Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 
444 (Conn. 2008)). This reasoning still begs the question, how should courts 
determine political strength? 
267. See Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, Calling Obama Black Insults His Mother, 
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 10, 2008, at B6 (questioning whether 
Barack Obama should be categorized as black); Karen J. Hunter, Why Do We 
Call Obama Black?, HARTFORD COURANT, May 25, 2008, at C3 (same); L.A. 
Johnson, Obama Candidacy Raises Old Questions About What Is Black, PITT. 
POST-GAZETTE, May 8, 2008, at A1 (same). 
An individual’s claimed group membership might be denied by other 
members of the group. Judy Scales-Trent has written eloquently, for instance, 
on how others have frequently rejected her claim to black identity because of 
her light skin. See JUDY SCALES-TRENT, NOTES OF A WHITE BLACK WOMAN 14 
(1995) (describing how some people perceive her as “a black person but ‘really 
white’”). 
268. See William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes 
Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE 
L.J. 1623, 1623 (1997) (discussing group-based civil rights campaigns and not- 
ing that “[g]roups are messy. They are, by definition, comprised of many indi- 
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Script-oriented theory clarifies that, even as women and 
communities of color increasingly cross power gaps, the United 
States is not yet in a post-gender or post-racial world because 
gender and racial scripts are still salient in the political 
realm.270 They may not produce power imbalances that map 
along traditional group lines, yet they create more complicated 
power inequalities and distort deliberative conversations. Ac- 
cordingly, race and sex still satisfy the second prong of the bi- 
furcated test for suspect status because they are both traits 
that are currently—and have historically been—the basis of 
identity scripting and they are not indicative of a person’s abili- 
ty to contribute to society. 
After courts establish that a status is suspect, the question 
of whether there is discrimination triggering heightened scru- 
tiny does not end. This is because the definition of discrimina- 
tion is not self-evident. The Court has stated that disparate 
treatment on suspect grounds always triggers heightened scru- 
tiny; however, disparate impact on suspect grounds does not 
trigger heightened scrutiny unless the law was motivated by 
invidious intent.271 The following sections critique these tests. 
In addition to addressing when to exercise scrutiny, the follow- 
ing sections also offer thoughts on how to apply heightened 
scrutiny. 
 
B. THE SEX DISCRIMINATION ARGUMENT FOR SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE 
The question of what qualifies as disparate treatment that 
triggers heightened scrutiny is relatively straightforward; how- 
ever, it has led to inconsistent case law in one particular con- 
 
viduals and thus encompass a range of desires and agendas.”); see also infra 
note 269. 
269. See Gloria Steinem, Wrong Woman, Wrong Message, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 
4, 2008, at 29 (“Palin’s value to . . . patriarchs is clear: She opposes just about 
every issue that women support by a majority or plurality.”); see also Bridge- 
man, supra note 143, at 1265 (explaining that Justice Clarence Thomas has 
been “ostracized by and alienated from large portions of the black communi- 
ty”); Gould, supra note 12, at 184 (“It would be odd indeed to think that Cla- 
rence Thomas could represent all African-Americans or that Margaret 
Thatcher could represent all women.”); John Blake, Can an Obama Presidency 
Hurt Black Americans?, CNN.COM, July 22, 2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/ 
POLITICS/07/22/obama.hurt.blacks (suggesting that an Obama presidency 
might undermine the black community’s best interests). 
270. See supra Part I. 
271. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 225, at 644 –46 (discussing judicial 
scrutiny). 
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text: equally applied sex distinctions in marriage laws.272 Same-
sex marriage bans treat men and women differently inso- far as 
the laws embody a sex distinction.273 For example, a woman 
who wishes to marry her female partner cannot do so because 
she is a woman; she would, however, be able to marry her 
female partner if she were a man. As such, the law treats her in 
a particular way due to her sex. In same-sex marriage 
litigation, one of the couples’ typical arguments is that these 
sex distinctions amount to disparate treatment on the basis of 
sex, triggering heightened scrutiny.274 In these cases, most 
state supreme court justices275 have either ignored or rejected 
the sex discrimination argument for same-sex marriage.276 
 
272. See Lau, supra note 182, at 852–57 (2008) (summarizing case law on 
marriage laws’ sex distinctions); Deborah A. Widiss et al., Exposing Sex Ste- 
reotypes in Recent Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARV. J.L. & GEND- 
ER 461, 472–79 (2007) (same). 
273. In all but six states, laws limit marriage to opposite-sex couples. See 
Joanna L. Grossman & Edward Stein, The State of the Same-Sex Union, FIND- 
LAW, July 7, 2009, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20090707.html. 
New York does not issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples but recognizes 
same-sex couples’ marriages licenses from other jurisdictions. See Tina Kelley, 
New York Gay Couples Head to Massachusetts with Marriage in Mind, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 3, 2008, at B3. 
274. This sex discrimination argument is usually paired with claims that 
marriage laws impermissibly discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation 
and that they violate the fundamental right to marry. See generally Andrew 
Koppelman, Three Arguments for Gay Rights, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1636, 1638 
(1997) (summarizing those arguments). In previous writing, I have argued 
that the sex discrimination argument for same-sex marriage is important but 
insufficient. Courts ought to recognize that same-sex marriage bans discrimi- 
nate both based on sex and based on sexual orientation. See Lau, supra note 
182, at 874 –75. 
275. See Michael Clarkson & Ronald S. Allen, Same-Sex Marriage and Civ- 
il Unions: ‘Til State Borders Do Us Part?, BRIEF, Spring 2007, at 54, 54 (“The 
legal battles and challenges [concerning same-sex marriage] are still ongoing 
in most states but as of yet have not been waged in the federal courts.”). There 
are, however, two pending high-profile federal same-sex marriage cases. For 
background on the federal case in California, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 
3:09-cv-02292 (N.D. Cal. filed May 22, 2009), see American Foundation for 
Equal Rights, http://www.equalrightsfoundation.org/press.html (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2010). For background on the federal case in Massachusetts, Gill v. 
Office of Personnel Management, No. 1:09-cv-10309 (D. Mass. filed Mar. 3, 
2009), see GLAD, http://www.glad.org/work/cases/gill-vs-office-of-personnel 
-management (last visited Jan. 27, 2010). 
276. Among same-sex marriage cases in which state high courts have re- 
cently issued judgments, the majority opinions have typically rejected the sex 
discrimination argument either implicitly or explicitly. A notable exception is 
Baehr v. Lewin, which held that Hawaii’s same-sex marriage ban discrimi- 
nated on the basis of sex and, therefore, warranted heightened scrutiny. Baehr 
v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993). The decision was later rendered moot 
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The sex discrimination argument was explicitly rejected by 
high-court majorities in California, Maryland, New York, 
Washington, and Vermont.277 In Massachusetts and Connecti- 
cut, the majorities ignored the sex discrimination argument, 
even though they held that excluding same-sex couples from 
marriage was unconstitutional.278 One concurring justice in 
Massachusetts supported the sex discrimination argument.279 
However, three dissenting justices rejected the argument.280 
The justices in Iowa and New Jersey also ignored the sex dis- 
crimination argument, even though they all agreed that exclud- 
ing same-sex couples from the rights and responsibilities of 
marriage violated their respective state constitutions.281 
The justices who reject the sex discrimination argument 
typically note correctly that the sex distinctions apply equally 
to both men and women.282 That is to say, even though same- 
 
by an amendment to Hawaii’s constitution granting the legislature the power 
to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23. Some 
lower-level state courts have endorsed the Baehr argument. See, e.g., Marriage 
Cases, No. 4365, 2005 WL 583129, at *8–10 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2005), 
rev’d, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675 (Ct. App. 2006), rev’d, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); 
Varnum v. Brien, No. CV5965, 2007 WL 2468667 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Aug. 30, 
2007), aff’d, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
277. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 436–40, 452 (Cal. 2008) (re- 
jecting the argument, but holding that withholding marriage rights from 
same-sex couples was unconstitutional); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 
591–602, 635 (Md. 2007) (rejecting the argument during the course of uphold- 
ing a same-sex marriage ban); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 11, 22 (N.Y. 
2006) (same); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 987–90 (Wash. 2006) 
(same); see also Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 880–81 n.13, 889 (Vt. 1999) (re- 
jecting the argument, but holding that denying same-sex couples the rights 
and responsibilities of marriage violated Vermont’s constitution). 
278. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 
2008) (“[W]e do not reach the plaintiffs’ claims . . . that the state’s bar against 
same sex marriage . . . discriminates on the basis of sex . . . .”); Goodridge v. 
Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 & n.21 (Mass. 2003) (applying ra- 
tional basis review rather than strict scrutiny, which would have been re- 
quired if the bar against same-sex marriage discriminated on the basis of sex). 
279. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 971 (Greaney, J., concurring). 
280. See id. at 992 (Cordy, J., dissenting). 
281. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009) (holding that 
the Iowa Constitution requires allowing same-sex couples to marry, but be- 
cause there is no important governmental objective furthered by the prohibi- 
tion of same-sex marriage, not because the prohibition discriminates on the 
basis of sex); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 224 (N.J. 2006) (holding that the 
New Jersey Constitution requires same-sex couples to have the opportunity to 
enjoy the same rights and benefits as heterosexual married couples, but be- 
cause failing to grant them that opportunity violates the guarantee of equal 
protection to same-sex couples, not because of sex discrimination). 
282. See Jeffrey A. Williams, The Equal Application Defense: The Equal 
  
954 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [94:897 
 
sex marriage bans differentiate between two groups of people— 
men and women—both groups have their marriage options li- 
mited based on their sex. These justices then reason that equal 
application of the sex distinction neutralizes any disparate 
treatment and that equally applied sex distinctions ought not 
to trigger heightened scrutiny unless the distinctions were in- 
tended to entrench—or have the effect of entrenching—group- 
based hierarchy.283 Because they do not believe that marriage 
laws subordinate women to men, or vice versa, they refuse to 
review same-sex marriage bans under heightened scrutiny.284 
In essence, these justices have created a group- 
subordination test stipulating that equally applied sex distinc- 
tions must subordinate a particular sex to trigger heightened 
scrutiny.285 These justices distinguish same-sex marriage bans 
from the antimiscegenation law at issue in Loving v. Virgin- 
ia,286 noting that the latter was enacted to reinforce white su- 
premacy; therefore, antimiscegenation laws’ equally applied 
race distinctions passed the judicially constructed group- 
subordination test.287 
 
Application Defense, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1207, 1215–18, 1221 (2007) (sum- 
marizing same-sex marriage cases and arguing that the “enduring assertion of 
the equal application defense is that equal application erases the burden of a 
facial classification”); supra note 276. 
283. See, e.g., Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 601 (Md. 2007) (asserting 
that, “[a]bsent some showing that [the same-sex marriage ban] was designed 
to subordinate either men to women or women to men as a class,” the ban did 
not amount to sex discrimination triggering heightened scrutiny (internal quo- 
tation marks omitted)); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 11 (N.Y. 2006) (re- 
fusing heightened scrutiny on the basis of sex discrimination because 
“[p]laintiffs [did] not argue . . . that [New York’s same-sex marriage ban] is de- 
signed to subordinate either men to women or women to men as a class”); 
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 880–81 n.13 (Vt. 1999) (refusing heightened 
scrutiny because “[t]he evidence does not demonstrate such a purpose [behind 
Vermont’s marriage laws] . . . [to] subordinate[ ] women to men”); Andersen v. 
King County, 138 P.3d 963, 988 (Wash. 2006) (refusing heightened scrutiny 
due to the belief that Washington’s same-sex marriage ban did not subordi- 
nate women). 
284. See supra note 283. 
285. For an in-depth discussion of this test, see generally Lau, supra note 
182, at 846–55, 858–61 (providing background on the test and arguing that it 
cannot be supported by a proper reading of case law). 
286. 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (holding that Virginia’s antimiscegenation law 
was unconstitutional). 
287. See, e.g., Deane, 932 A.2d at 601 (“[W]e find the analogy to Loving in- 
apposite.”); Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 11 (“[Marriage exclusions are] not the 
kind of sham equality that the Supreme Court confronted in Loving; the sta- 
tute there, prohibiting black and white people from marrying each other, was 
in substance anti-black legislation.”); Baker, 744 A.2d at 880 n.13 (“[R]eliance 
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Commentators have argued that rejecting the sex discrim- 
ination argument for same-sex marriage is incorrect.288 Some 
posit that sex distinctions in marriage laws do subordinate 
women and, therefore, satisfy a group-subordination test.289 
Others claim that justices who have rejected the sex discrimi- 
nation argument have misread Loving v. Virginia, which did 
not embody a group-subordination test.290 In addition, commen- 
tators argue that group subordination ought not to be a re- 
quirement for heightened scrutiny because, regardless of 
whether marriage laws subordinate a particular sex, marriage 
laws’ sex distinctions reinforce gender stereotyping291 that in- 
hibits personal autonomy.292 
Script-oriented democracy reinforcement theory extends 
this last argument. Gender scripting not only limits individu- 
 
[on Loving] is misplaced. There the high court had little difficulty in looking 
behind the superficial neutrality of Virginia’s anti-miscegenation statute to 
hold that its real purpose was to maintain the pernicious doctrine of white su- 
premacy.”); Andersen, 138 P.3d at 989 (“Loving is not analogous. In Loving the 
Court determined that the purpose of the antimiscegenation statute was racial 
discrimination . . . .”). 
In Loving, the Court twice noted in dicta that Virginia’s antimiscegena- 
tion law was enacted to reinforce white supremacy. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 7, 
11. 
288. See infra notes 295–300 and accompanying text. 
289. See, e.g., ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CON- 
TEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW 64 –71 (2002) (arguing that the stigmas attached 
both to gay men and lesbians “have gender-specific forms that imply that men 
ought to have power over women”); Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing in Action? 
Searching for Gender Talk in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 16 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 97, 105 (2005) (“[L]aws prohibiting same-sex coupling . . . preserve 
a gender hierarchy in which women must remain subordinate to men.”). 
290. See, e.g., KOPPELMAN, supra note 289, at 62–64 (pointing out that “a 
party challenging a racially discriminatory statute does not need to show any- 
thing about the statute’s relation to racism,” and arguing that a party chal- 
lenging a statute that discriminates on the basis of sex need not demonstrate a 
relationship between the statute and the subordination of women); Appleton, 
supra note 289, at 107 (“[T]he racial classification itself triggered heightened 
scrutiny.”); Lau, supra note 182, at 855 (arguing that Loving does not impose a 
group subordination requirement). 
291. See infra notes 295–302 and accompanying text (explaining how sex- 
based classifications reinforce gender scripting). 
292. See Appleton, supra note 289, at 107 (discussing gender scripts’ effects 
on autonomy); Case, supra note 33, at 1472–73 (arguing that gender scripts 
are problematic “even in law that does not in any articulable way subordinate 
women to men”); Lau, supra note 182, at 869 (arguing that sex distinctions 
essentialize the sexes, limiting individuals’ capacity for self-definition); Sylvia 
A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 969 
(1984) (advocating protections of “each person’s authority to define herself or 
himself, free from sex-defined legal constraints”). 
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als’ authority to shape their own lives; at a systemic level, 
gender scripts compromise political deliberation.293 In the in- 
terest of democracy reinforcement, courts should eschew the 
group-subordination test and adopt a formal rule that subjects 
sex distinctions to heightened scrutiny, regardless of whether 
the distinctions are applied equally.294 
Courts should review sex-based distinctions with heigh- 
tened scrutiny because they risk entrenching gender scripts. 
Social science literature suggests that the mere act of categoriz- 
ing individuals by group statuses can reify socially constructed 
differences between the groups.295 Courts should have latitude 
to give sex-based distinctions a hard second look to ensure that, 
if sex distinctions entrench gender scripting, such harm to de- 
mocracy is sufficiently outweighed by government interests. 
Courts are also justified in exercising a hard second look be- 
cause sex distinctions embodied in law may have been informed 
by scripted notions of gender roles in the first place. 
 
 
 
 
293. See supra Part I.C. 
294. It is worth emphasizing that a strong doctrinal argument for this for- 
mal rule already exists. See supra note 290. This Article provides additional 
normative support, based on democracy reinforcement, for the doctrinal rule. 
295. See, e.g., Phyllis Anastasio et al., Categorization, Recategorization and 
Common Ingroup Identity, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF STEREOTYPING AND 
GROUP LIFE 236, 237 (Russell Spears et al. eds., 1997) (“The mere act of classi- 
fying individuals into social categories not only guides people’s cognitive im- 
pressions  of  others,  but  impacts   upon   their   affective   reactions   as   
well. . . . [E]ven categorization along arbitrary dimensions leads to bias.”); 
Krieger, supra note 23, at 1191–92 (“The experiments showed that, as soon a 
[sic] people are divided into groups—even on a trivial or even random basis— 
strong biases in their perception of differences, evaluation, and reward alloca- 
tion result. As soon as the concept of ‘groupness’ is introduced, subjects perce- 
ive members of their group as more similar to them, and members of different 
groups as more different from them, than when those same persons are simply 
viewed as noncategorized individuals.”); Mitnick, supra note 249, at 865 (ar- 
guing specifically that legal categories have  a  role  in  “further  construct-  
ing social labels, and thereby entrenching and constituting social perceptions, 
statuses, and identities”); Penelope Oakes, The Categorization Process: Cogni- 
tion and the Group in the Social Psychology of Stereotyping, in SOCIAL GROUPS 
AND IDENTITIES: DEVELOPING THE LEGACY OF HENRI TAJFEL 95, 97–98 (W. 
Peter Robinson ed., 1998) (summarizing literature on how “mere categoriza- 
tion” fuels stereotyping); Don Operario & Susan T. Fiske, Integrating Social 
Identity and Social Cognition: A Framework for Bridging Diverse Perspectives, 
in SOCIAL IDENTITY AND SOCIAL COGNITION 26, 26–49 (Dominic Abrams & Mi- 
chael A. Hogg eds., 1999) (providing background on relevant social science li- 
terature). 
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To be sure, marriage laws do not explicitly require hus- 
bands and wives to perform different gender roles.296 For ex- 
ample, husbands today are legally free to be homemakers and 
wives are free to be breadwinners. Nonetheless, the sex-based 
entry requirement for marriage runs the risk of reinforcing 
people’s gendered social understanding of legal marriage. Laws 
that define marriage as uniting “one man” with “one woman” 
reify differences between men and women, implying that men 
share a common gender role that is somehow discrete from the 
gender role shared by women.297 
Indeed, sociologist Steven Nock referred to marriage as a 
“gender factory.”298 To clarify how marriage reproduces gender 
roles, Nock offered the example of unemployed men for whom 
being a husband means performing a masculinity script: 
[I]n a two-earner marriage, the rational husband would do more 
housework if he were to become unemployed. Unemployed husbands, 
however, do exactly the opposite. Shortly after losing their jobs, such 
men actually reduce their housework labor. For a married man to be 
unemployed is to deviate from cultural scripts of masculine identity. 
For such a man to assume responsibility for the “feminine” tasks of 
housework would be even more deviant.299 
Numerous commentators have suggested that removing 
marriage’s sex-based entry requirement would abate the laws’ 
implicit endorsement of the gender scripts described by 
Nock.300 
 
296. See Appleton, supra note 289, at 116 (“[L]awmakers have developed 
gender-neutral rules for alimony, childcare, work outside the home, family 
leaves, and the like.”). 
297. See supra note 295 and accompanying text. 
298. Steven L. Nock, Time and Gender in Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1971, 
1977 (2000). 
299. Id. For another discussion on how marriage reproduces gender scripts, 
see Suzanne A. Kim, Marital Naming/Naming Marriage: Language and Sta- 
tus in Family Law, 85 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn 
.com/abstract=1351133. Kim notes that most married women take their hus- 
bands’ surnames and explains how that dynamic both reflects and reinforces 
gender roles. See id. Furthermore, she posits that opening marriage to same- 
sex couples would disrupt the gender roles within marriage. See id. 
300. See LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACI- 
TY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 156 (2006) (“Permitting same-sex mar- 
riage is . . . an entailment of affirming gender equality—rather than gender 
hierarchy and rigid gender roles—as a component of marriage.”); Appleton, 
supra note 289, at 116 (claiming that legalizing same-sex marriage would be 
consistent with principles against sex stereotyping); Case, supra note 33, at 
1488 (arguing that allowing same-sex couples to marry would have an “anti[- 
sex] stereotyping impact”); Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A 
Feminist Inquiry, 1 L. & SEXUALITY 9, 16 (1991) (arguing that legalizing same-
sex marriage would destabilize the cultural meaning of marriage and 
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Due to the prevalence of gender scripting in American cul- 
ture, courts should indeed have the opportunity to give mar- 
riage laws’ sex distinctions heightened scrutiny to ensure that 
they were not motivated by gender scripts. Consider the New 
York Court of Appeals, which stated in Hernandez v. Robles 
that marriage law could be informed by the “common-sense 
premise that children will do best with a mother and father in 
the home,”301 and that “[i]ntuition and experience suggest that 
a child benefits from having before his or her eyes, every day, 
living models of what both a man and a woman are like.”302 
This language suggests that “common sense” gender scripts 
may taint democratic deliberation on marriage laws. Fostering 
beliefs that there are a scripted “model man” and a scripted 
“model woman” should not be a government interest that satis- 
fies heightened scrutiny.303 
It is worth reemphasizing that, from a strictly doctrinal 
standpoint, commentators have already argued that marriage 
laws embodying sex distinctions should be reviewed under 
heightened scrutiny.304 Alternatively, one can read doctrine to 
include a categorical rule against government policies that ste- 
reotype based on sex, including same-sex marriage bans.305 
This section thickens the normative support for those doctrinal 
 
socially constructed gender roles); Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation 
and Collective Responsibility for Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 237– 
38 (positing that legalizing same-sex marriage would “signal that [modern 
marriage] is a union not grounded in hierarchical gender roles”); see also Syl- 
via A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. 
REV. 187, 207–12 (arguing that visibility of gays and lesbians has transformed 
social understandings of gender roles). But see Nock, supra note 298, at 1974 – 
75 (questioning the ability of law to change social norms). 
301. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 2006). 
302. Id. at 7. 
303. Note that, in contrast to this Article’s assertions, the New York Court 
of Appeals only exercised rational basis review in Hernandez v. Robles. See id. 
at 9. 
304. See, e.g., KOPPELMAN, supra note 289, at 63–64 (pointing out that to 
challenge a statute on equal protection grounds, a challenger need only show 
“that there is a classification of a kind that is subject to heightened scrutiny,” 
such as sex); Appleton, supra note 289, at 107 (reasoning that the requirement 
of heightened scrutiny in Loving necessarily implies heightened scrutiny of 
marriage laws embodying sex distinctions); Lau, supra note 182, at 845–46 
(arguing that laws that make sex-based distinctions must now be “subject to 
heightened scrutiny regardless of their substantive effects”). 
305. Mary Anne Case has argued that the Supreme Court’s sex discrimina- 
tion jurisprudence has actually moved away from “conventional application of 
heightened scrutiny” toward a strict categorical “rule against sex- 
stereotyping.” See Case, supra note 33, at 1452. 
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arguments by hooking them to democracy reinforcement ratio- 
nales. By following doctrine that supports the sex discrimina- 
tion argument for same-sex marriage, courts would not be 
trumping democratic rule. To the contrary, courts would be 
ameliorating gender-based impairments to deliberative democ- 
racy. 
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that heightened scru- 
tiny of equally applied sex distinctions does not—and should 
not—mean that all sex distinctions are per se unconstitution- 
al.306 This Article simply argues that heightened scrutiny is 
appropriate for equally applied sex distinctions. The state has 
often satisfied heightened scrutiny of sex discrimination.307 For 
present purposes, this Article merely argues that democracy 
reinforcement supports the idea that equally applied sex dis- 
tinctions amount to disparate treatment triggering heightened 
scrutiny and that reinforcing gender scripts ought not be a gov- 
ernment interest that satisfies such heightened review. 
C. RACIAL INTEGRATION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
Racial integration in public schools provides a contrasting 
case of equally applied distinctions. In the recent case of Par- 
ents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District308 
the Court reviewed Seattle’s and Louisville’s racial integration 
programs under strict scrutiny.309 Script-oriented democracy 
 
306. Indeed, there may sometimes be countervailing public-regarding rea- 
sons to justify laws’ express differentiation between men and women. Under 
existing jurisprudence, sex-based classifications that address physical differ- 
ences between men and women are usually deemed constitutional. See, e.g., 
Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 473 (1981) (justify- 
ing a statutory rape law protecting underage girls, but not boys, because the 
sex-based distinction was based on a “real” asymmetry: girls can become preg- 
nant, but no boy can). For discussions on how the Court has sometimes con- 
fused stereotyped differences for real differences, see, for example, David B. 
Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1002–03 (2002); 
Law, supra note 292, at 987–1002. For arguments that both biological and cul- 
tural differences between men and women should sometimes be taken into 
consideration to further substantive equality, see, for example, Christine Lit- 
tleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1332–35 (1987). 
See also Kimberly J. Jenkins, Constitutional Lessons for the Next Generation of 
Public Single-Sex Elementary and Secondary Schools, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1953, 1953 (2006) (arguing that sex-segregated schools should sometimes sur- 
vive heightened scrutiny). 
307. See supra note 306. 
308. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 2738 
(2007). 
309. Notably, the racial integration program at stake in Parents Involved 
was intended to combat segregation and no Justice argued that the program 
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reinforcement theory suggests that the Court was correct to 
subject the programs to heightened review, but applied a form 
of heightened review that was too stringent. 
In Seattle and Louisville, students chose the schools that 
they wanted to attend, subject to some constraints including 
race-based constraints.310 The race-based constraints applied 
equally to students regardless of their race; for example, in 
Seattle, “white” students were constrained when applying to 
schools already oversubscribed with white students and “non- 
white” students were constrained when applying to schools al- 
ready oversubscribed with nonwhites.311 Parents Involved 
shows that the Court applies heightened scrutiny to all racial 
classifications, even if they are equally applied and do not rein- 
force group-based racial hierarchy.312 
In Parents Involved, the Court erred—not in reviewing the 
programs under heightened scrutiny, but by applying a virtual- 
ly “fatal in fact” version of heightened review that amounted to 
a policy of color-blindness.313 The Court was correct to employ 
heightened review because even race distinctions intended as 
means to beneficent ends risk entrenching race-based scripts 
that impair democracy.314 As Goodwin Liu, a proponent of ra- 
cial diversity in education, wrote: “[R]ace-conscious school as- 
signment is not immune to the risk of racial stereotyping and 
other harms associated with government decision-making 
 
 
 
subordinated any particular race; the programs disadvantaged students—both 
whites and nonwhites—who sought to attend a school already oversubscribed 
with students of the same race. See Lau, supra note 182, at 855–56 (discussing 
the effects of the racial integration programs at stake in Parents Involved, 127 
S. Ct. at 2747–48). 
310. In both of the school districts, students applied to schools of their 
choice and the districts used race as a tiebreaker to determine school assign- 
ments to racially imbalanced schools. The race-based tiebreaker was applied 
equally across races. For example, Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that, 
for the 2000–2001 academic year, Seattle’s racial tiebreaker sometimes fa- 
vored white students and sometimes favored nonwhite students. See Parents 
Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2747–48; see also Lau, supra note 182, at 855–56 (pro- 
viding background on the racial integration programs). 
311. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2747–48. I use the racial labels 
“white” and “nonwhite” because they were the categories that Seattle used. 
See id. 
312. See Lau, supra note 182, at 857–61. 
313. In previous writing, I have criticized heightened review that is so 
stringent as to be “fatal in fact.” See id. at 849, 872–73. 
314. See supra note 295 and accompanying text. 
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based on race. [Heightened] scrutiny ensures that those harms 
are minimized or avoided.”315 
Commentators have criticized Parents Involved—rightly 
so—for its outcome.316 However, it is imperative to bring 
nuance to these critiques. Some commentators, including prom- 
inent jurists like Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit, have 
suggested that equally applied racial distinctions should not 
trigger heightened scrutiny if they were enacted with benevo- 
lent intentions.317 This argument is, however, misguided. First 
off, benevolence can be difficult to assess. Moreover, even bene- 
volent intentions can produce the inadvertent negative effect of 
unduly entrenching racial scripts. This was the case in Califor- 
nia v. Johnson, where inmate segregation risked entrenching 
racial scripts even though the state’s goal of preventing vi- 
olence was benign.318 The state could have, and should have, 
avoided the entrenchment of racial scripts by employing other 
means to prevent violence. 
At first glance, the racial integration program in Seattle 
raised concerns about entrenching harmful stereotypes, espe- 
cially since the program grouped all “nonwhite” students into 
one category even though “nonwhites” were quite diverse.319 
This categorization scheme risked stereotyping all nonwhites 
 
315. Goodwin Liu, Seattle and Louisville, 95 CAL. L. REV. 277, 280–81 
(2007) (“When government acts on the premise that racial difference and divi- 
sion permeate our society, it runs the risk of magnifying the perception or re- 
ality of those differences.”); see also Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2758 (ex- 
pressing concern that racial balancing would effectively reinforce racial 
stereotypes); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Re- 
lations After Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1259–61 (1998) (ar- 
guing that social science suggests affirmative action programs run the risk of 
entrenching stereotypes, but that those risks can be overcome); Krieger, supra 
note 23 (summarizing social science literature on how “mere categorization” 
risks entrenching perceptions of group-based differences). 
316. See, e.g., Editorial, Fracturing a Landmark, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 
2007, at A34; Donald Jones, Op-Ed., Race: Integration Benefits All, MIAMI HE- 
RALD, July 28, 2007, at A35; Kenneth W. Mack, Which Side is Brown vs.  
Board on?, L.A. TIMES, July 4, 2007, at A21 (same); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., 
Op-Ed., Brown’s Legacy Lives, but Barely, BOSTON GLOBE, June 29, 2007, at 
A17 (same); Editorial, Resegregation Now, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at A28. 
317. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 426 F.3d 
1162, 1193–96 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring), rev’d 127 S. 
Ct. 2738, 2768 (2007). 
318. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 506–07 (2005) (holding that Cali- 
fornia’s policy of segregating inmates by race could not withstand strict scru- 
tiny, even though the policy was intended to prevent violence). 
319. Seattle’s population was approximately 24% Asian, 24% black, 11% 
Latino, and 41% white. Liu, supra note 315, at 286–88. 
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as interchangeable.320 This construction of binary racial catego- 
ries, white and nonwhite, raises concerns not only because it 
reinforces the salience of racial scripts generally,321 but also be- 
cause binary scripts are particularly harmful for at least three 
reasons. 
First, the oppositional categories of whites and nonwhites 
reinforce the country’s history of “racial othering,” where 
whiteness is regarded as the ideal script against which other 
racial identities are defined and (de)valued.322 Second, because 
the dominant racial paradigm in America is the black-white bi- 
nary, the category of nonwhite is easily conflated with black, 
rendering other groups such as Asian Americans invisible.323 
Third, to the extent that groups such as Asian Americans are 
not invisible, clumping communities of color under one label 
can still be problematic. Frank Wu has explained how problems 
with the unrealistic model minority script for Asian Americans 
are exacerbated when society conflates Asian American identi- 
ty with other minority identities.324 Because different groups 
face different prejudices and structural barriers to achieve- 
ment, the idea that any group can serve as a “model” for others 
is problematic.325 Treating nonwhites as a monolithic entity fa- 
cilitates this problematic thinking.326 
Despite these concerns, the programs in Seattle and Louis- 
ville should have survived heightened review. Although this 
Article stops short of prescribing a specific test for heightened 
scrutiny,327 it does contend that strict scrutiny, at least as it 
was exercised in Parents Involved’s plurality and concurring 
opinions, was an overly stringent version of heightened review. 
Both Seattle’s and Louisville’s integration programs ultimately 
contributed to the undoing of racial scripts, which would rein- 
 
320. See id. 
321. On how “mere categorization” contributes to stereotyping, see supra 
note 295 and Lau, supra note 182, at 866–69. 
322. See Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Borders (En)gendered: Nor- 
mativities, Latinas, and a Latcrit Paradigm, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 882, 885–92 
(1997) (describing the phenomenon of “othering” whereby minority identities, 
and the value of minority cultures, are defined in opposition to a dominant, 
majoritarian identity). 
323. See Robert S. Chang, The Nativist’s Dream of Return, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 
55, 55 (1996) (analyzing how Asian Americans have historically been omitted 
from American racial discourse, which focuses on black-white dynamics). 
324. See WU, supra note 18, at 64 –66. 
325. See id. at 64 –67. 
326. See id. 
327. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
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force democratic deliberation. Even though use of racial catego- 
ries in school integration raises concerns about stereotypes in 
the short term, fostering interracial socialization in educational 
settings likely has the net effect of reducing stereotyping,328 
thereby enhancing democratic deliberation in the long term. 
Social science research suggests that interaction among a di- 
verse student body helps to dispel myths behind racial stereo- 
types.329 
Accordingly, the plurality in Parents Involved was incorrect 
to assert that racial diversity is not a compelling government 
interest in K–12 education contexts.330 Racial diversity should 
be considered a sufficient government interest for purposes of 
heightened review, because diversity reinforces democracy by 
combating stereotypes. As for whether Seattle’s and Louisville’s 
racial integration programs were sufficiently related to the goal 
of diversity, commentators have argued that the programs were 
likely to be the most effective means for achieving racial diver- 
sity.331 
 
 
328. See Liu, supra note 315, at 282–90 (suggesting that race-based inte- 
gration programs can combat stereotyping in the long run, rather than ex- 
acerbate notions of racial difference in society). 
329. See Anastasio et al., supra note 295, at 239–40 (discussing how cate- 
gorizing individuals for the purpose of uniting social groups can have the ul- 
timate effect of destabilizing the salience of group stereotypes); Krieger, supra 
note 315, at 1275 (same); Liu, supra note 315, at 284 –85 (discussing social 
science literature on racial integration’s effects on stereotyping). Researchers 
often use the term “contact hypothesis” to refer to this notion that socialization 
among diverse individuals reduces stereotypes. For a recent insightful discus- 
sion of the contact hypothesis in employment contexts, see Green, supra note 
6, at 381–88. 
330. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. 
Ct. 2738, 2752–59 (2007) (plurality opinion) (arguing that racial diversity in 
K–12 education is not a compelling government interest). In his concurring 
opinion, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that diversity is a compelling interest 
in K–12 education settings. Id. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice 
Kennedy argued, however, that the racial integration programs at hand were 
not narrowly tailored to achieve such diversity. Id. at 2791–97. 
331. See James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 
121 HARV. L. REV. 131, 154 –55 (2008) (arguing that the schools’ programs 
were the most direct means for achieving racial diversity and combating racial 
isolation); see also Krieger, supra note 315, at 1276–1329 (arguing that color- 
blind policies are less effective than affirmative action programs in reducing 
bias). 
Goodwin Liu has suggested that the white/nonwhite scheme was defensi- 
ble in the specific context of Seattle because there was, in fact, little variance 
among nonwhites in terms of their residence or school preferences. Liu, supra 
note 315, at 286–90. Liu explains: 
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In sum, there ought to be a formal rule that explicit racial 
distinctions—like sex distinctions—trigger heightened scrutiny, 
regardless of whether they are equally applied and regardless 
of whether they reinforce group-based hierarchies. These classi- 
fications potentially entrench scripts that compromise demo- 
cratic deliberation. Courts should have the authority to double 
check that the government’s constructions of sex and racial cat- 
egories do more good than harm. Importantly, however, these 
distinctions should pass heightened review if their benefits to 
democracy counterweigh their costs, for example, in the case of 
certain state-sanctioned racial integration programs.332 
The law has a powerful expressive function.333 Heightened 
review of sex and race classifications sends a significant social 
message. Heightened review signals that society should view 
race and sex distinctions with skepticism.334 Just as the gov- 
ernment should be judicious in categorizing individuals based 
on race or sex, private members of society should also think 
carefully before making generalized judgments based on race or 
sex, especially during the process of democratic deliberation. 
D. RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS PROFILING 
Script-oriented theory also provides some guidance for dis- 
parate impact doctrine. At present, state action that does not 
discriminate on its face but has a disproportionate impact 
based on a suspect status does not trigger heightened review 
unless the court finds that invidious intent motivated the 
 
[I] nstead of stereotyping nonwhite groups as interchangeable, the 
white/nonwhite dichotomy in the Seattle plan simply responds to the 
reality of the city’s stark racial geography. The plan illustrates that 
the expressive value of a racial classification can be quite different 
when examined in local context than when considered in the abstract. 
Id. at 288. A similar use of white/nonwhite categories elsewhere may have 
been less defensible than it was in Seattle. See id. at 286–90. This sort of 
nuanced analysis is what heightened review should ensure. 
332. Cf. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 203–05 
(1991) (arguing that presumptions are correctly rebutted when rebuttal better 
serves the underlying purpose of the presumption). 
Note that this section has argued that democracy reinforcement is one 
reason why Seattle’s and Louisville’s programs should have passed heightened 
scrutiny. This analysis does not preclude the possibility that the programs suf- 
ficiently advanced other government interests in a way that should also save 
the programs from constitutional challenge. 
333. For background, see Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of 
Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2021–25 (1996). 
334. See supra Part II.B. 
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law.335 This test has spawned a cottage industry of criticism, 
which typically argues that constitutional law on disparate im- 
pact is underprotective.336 
Despite commentators’ criticisms, courts have held stead- 
fastly onto their test for discriminatory motive. A common rea- 
son offered for the discriminatory-motive test is that lowering 
the bar for disparate impact claims would open the floodgates 
to litigation.337 In other words, the discriminatory-motive test is 
embraced as a limiting principle. Consider a hypothetical in 
which the government funds research on a medical condition 
that disproportionately affects Asian Americans. Should that 
funding decision trigger heightened review simply because it 
disproportionately benefits a particular racial group? Some 
commentators have expressed concern that lowering the bar for 
 
 
335. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238–48 (1976) (rejecting dis- 
parate impact arguments in a case regarding race discrimination). Several 
statutory antidiscrimination laws, however, do not include an intent require- 
ment for disparate impact claims. See Rosemary C. Hunter & Elaine W. Sho- 
ben, Disparate Impact Discrimination: American Oddity or Internationally Ac- 
cepted Concept?, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 108, 112–15 (1998) 
(explaining that the Supreme Court has not required plaintiffs in Title VII 
cases to demonstrate that the employer acted with a discriminatory purpose). 
336. See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 
374 n.5 (2007) (listing articles that have criticized the limited scope of colora- 
ble disparate impact claims). 
Relatedly, commentators have criticized the United States’ exceptionalism 
compared to foreign peers on the topic of disparate impact. See, e.g., Arthur 
Chaskalson, Brown v. Board of Education: Fifty Years Later, 36 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 503, 510–11 (2005) (explaining that South African courts do not 
require discrimination claims to prove intent and in this way South Africa fol- 
lows the Canadian approach on this issue); Hunter & Shoben, supra note 335, 
at 115–23, 131 (examining disparate impact jurisprudence in the European 
Court of Justice, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and 
UN treaty bodies, and asserting that “[t]he limitations imposed on the applica- 
tion of disparate impact analysis in the United States have not been reflected 
in international jurisdictions”); Lau, supra note 225, at 85–90 (explaining the 
lack of an intent requirement for disparate impact claims in Hong Kong). 
337. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 180, at 1013–14 (noting the “floodgates” ar- 
gument); Andrew D. Leipold, Objective Tests and Subjective Bias: Some Prob- 
lems of Discriminatory Intent in the Criminal Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559, 
561–62 (1998) (noting suggestions that intent requirements prevent frivolous 
discrimination claims); Todd Rakoff, Washington v. Davis and the Objective 
Theory of Contracts, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63, 69 (1994) (noting that, 
without intent as a limiting principle, disparate impact theory can be “overin- 
clusive”); Mark Spiegel, The Rule 11 Studies and Civil Rights Cases: An In- 
quiry into the Neutrality of Procedural Rules, 32 CONN. L. REV. 155, 189 (1999) 
(“[T]he biggest problem with an impact rule [without an intent requirement] is 
overinclusiveness.”). 
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disparate impact claims would result in frivolous lawsuits, such 
as challenges to innocuous medical funding decisions.338 
Script-oriented theory offers an alternative to the status 
quo. An antistereotyping principle should coexist with the test 
for discriminatory motive. At least in terms of deliberative de- 
mocracy, among the most troubling of disparate impact claims 
are those that entrench identity scripts because scripting im- 
pairs deliberation. As such, courts should extend heightened 
review to cases of disparate impact that entrench scripts asso- 
ciated with suspect statuses, regardless of whether the dispa- 
rate impact resulted from invidious intent.339 
This proposed reform allows a new set of cases to fall with- 
in the domain of disparate impact cases triggering heightened 
scrutiny. Courts can define narrowly the set of disparate im- 
pact cases that reinforce stereotypes. Even with a narrow defi- 
nition, however, criminal profiling that generates substantial 
disparate impact based on race and religion340 should trigger 
heightened scrutiny because there is a rich literature on how 
the public perception of racial and religious profiling perpe- 
tuates corresponding stereotypes.341 
Consider the practice of Terry stops,342 which often involve 
racial or religious profiling.343 Even when statistical evidence 
 
338. See Leipold, supra note 337. 
339. See R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and 
Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 889–90 (2004) (arguing that equal 
protection analysis should shift focus from motives to harms). 
340. See, e.g., Volpp, supra note 28, at 1576–86 (discussing criminal profil- 
ing’s effects on Muslims); Melissa Whitney, Note, The Statistical Evidence of 
Racial Profiling in Traffic Stops and Searches: Rethinking the Use of Statistics 
To Prove Discriminatory Intent, 49 B.C. L. REV. 263, 282–83 (2008) (describing 
how criminal profiling at traffic stops has a disparate impact based on race). 
341. See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.- 
C.L. L. REV. 43, 60–62 (2009) [hereinafter Capers, Policing] (explaining how 
profiling policies perpetuate stereotypes); Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un- 
Balanced Fourth Amendment: A Cultural Study of the Drug War, Racial Pro- 
filing and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 861, 875–76 (2002) (same); Dorothy E. Ro- 
berts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order- 
Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 803–17 (1999) 
(same); David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 
1815–17 (2005) (same); Lisa Walter, Comment, Eradicating Racial Stereotyp- 
ing from Terry Stops: The Case for an Equal Protection Exclusionary Rule, 71 
U. COLO. L. REV. 255, 276 (2000) (same); I. Bennett Capers, Race, Citizenship, 
and the Fourth Amendment (Jan. 30, 2010) (unpublished manuscript on file 
with author) [hereinafter Capers, Race, Citizenship] (same). 
342. Terry stops got their name from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Terry 
stops are limited warrantless detentions based on “reasonable suspicion” that 
a person may be armed and dangerous. Id. at 27. Terry stops are an exception 
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shows that these practices generate substantial disparate im- 
pact based on race or religion, they are difficult to challenge 
under existing equal protection doctrine because invidious in- 
tent behind the practices is extremely difficult to prove.344 Un- 
der the proposed doctrinal reform, however, the practices 
should be reviewed under heightened scrutiny because the 
practices risk signaling an endorsement of criminality scripts 
based on race and religion.345 
 
to the “probable cause” requirement for search and seizures. Id. If law en- 
forcement agents have reasonable suspicion that a person is armed and dan- 
gerous, they can pair the limited detention and questioning with a pat down 
for weapons. Id. at 30. 
343. Among the most discussed forms of racial profiling are “pretextual 
traffic stops in the hope of discovering contraband . . . . This practice—known 
to some as driving while black or driving while brown—disproportionately im- 
pacts law-abiding minorities.” Capers, Policing, supra note 341, at 64; see also 
David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Pro- 
filing and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 298– 
303 (2001) (outlining empirical studies that describe the relationship between 
racial profiling and vehicle stops); Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Profiling, Terror- 
ism, and Time, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1181, 1203 (2005) (arguing that the Su- 
preme Court has failed to account for the fact that time is not experienced un- 
iformly by all people and that this failure has led to the deregulation of racial 
profiling); Capers, Race, Citizenship, supra note 341. 
344. For example, in United States v. Duque-Nava, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 
1153–64 (D. Kan. 2004), the court held that statistical evidence sufficed to 
prove that traffic stops had a race-based disparate impact, but refused to infer 
discriminatory intent from statistics on traffic stops. Courts are generally 
loathe to infer discriminatory intent from statistical evidence. See Kevin R. 
Johnson, Racial Profiling after September 11: The Department of  Justice’s 
2003 Guidelines, 50 LOY. L. REV. 67, 71–72 (2004) (summarizing equal protec- 
tion case law on racial profiling and noting the difficulty of proving intent); 
Whitney, supra note 340, at 280–82 (summarizing case law and calling the in- 
tent requirement for disparate impact claims a “virtual roadblock” to equal 
protection challenges against racial profiling). For an exceptional case, see 
State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 360 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (holding that 
unrebutted statistical evidence of racial profiling established discriminatory 
intent). 
345. See Lenhardt, supra note 339, at 895 (suggesting that a practice of 
Terry stops that disproportionately targets African American neighborhoods 
communicates a negative message about African Americans). 
To be clear, even after reforming the limiting principle for disparate im- 
pact claims, challenges to profiling policies will still be difficult because cur- 
rent evidentiary rules make proving disproportionate impact difficult. See Sa- 
rah Oliver, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista: The Disappearing Fourth 
Amendment and Its Impact on Racial Profiling, 5 J. L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 1, 
22–24 (2003) (describing the procedural hurdles related to evidence in racial 
profiling cases, especially after United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 
(1996), which made “access to discovery nearly impossible”). Democracy rein- 
forcement theory suggests that those evidentiary rules should also be re- 
formed to facilitate challenges against racial and religious profiling. See supra 
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This Article’s proposed reform joins other scholarship in 
arguing for courts in equal protection cases to inquire into the 
cultural implications of government policies.346 A likely objec- 
tion to the proposed antistereotyping principle is that courts do 
not have the capacity to assess whether policies reinforce ste- 
reotypes.347 Other writers have made strong rebuttals to such 
objections.348 While this Article cannot rehash all of those ar- 
guments, it is worth highlighting that courts already do identi- 
fy instances where laws perpetuate stereotypes.349 Moreover, 
the proposed inquiry into a law’s effects would be no more diffi- 
 
Part II.A (explaining the scope of the democracy reinforcement theory and its 
application). However, a full analysis of how to reform evidentiary rules is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
346. See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Pro- 
tection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000) (suggesting that courts evaluate the “ex- 
pressive content” of laws); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego,  and 
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 
324 (1987) (contending that courts should assess the “cultural meaning” of pol- 
icies); Lenhardt, supra note 339, at 878–82 (arguing that courts should ex- 
amine how laws contribute to racial stigma). 
It is not feasible to fully address within these pages the arguments how 
courts should assess the cultural implications of laws. It is worth noting, how- 
ever, that Robin Lenhardt has offered a particularly helpful article on the 
matter, arguing that courts can examine social and historical context to de- 
termine whether government policies risk reinforcing race-based stigma. See 
Lenhardt, supra note 339, at 891–96. Similarly, courts should examine social 
and historical contexts to determine whether policies entrench identity scripts. 
This Article focuses on scripts because it has been concerned with scripts’ rela- 
tion to democratic reinforcement. Focus on group-directed stigma and focus on 
scripts are not mutually exclusive; instead, they are likely to overlap. Cf. su- 
pra Part II.B–C (discussing how focuses on scripts and group subordination 
can coexist). 
347. See Lenhardt, supra note 339, at 925 (responding to the criticism that 
courts may lack the competence to address whether policies reinforce stereo- 
types). 
348. For existing rebuttals to this objection, see, for example, Lawrence, 
supra note 346, at 381–82 (defending the competence of the courts in applying 
the “cultural meaning” test); Lenhardt, supra note 339, at 925–26 (explaining 
that requiring courts to address policies within a specific context is not a novel 
concept). 
349. See supra note 253 and accompanying text (citing cases in which 
courts have examined the causes and effects of stereotyping); see also Susan T. 
Fiske et al., Social Science on Trial: Use of Sex Stereotyping Research in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1049, 1051–55 (1991) (describ- 
ing how courts used social science literature to discuss sex stereotyping in the 
landmark case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989)). Per- 
haps the most well-known and celebrated case in which the Supreme Court 
explored cultural implications of state action is Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U.S. 483, 493–95 (1954) (explaining that racial segregation was culturally 
understood as denoting the inferiority of African Americans). 
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cult than the current inquiry into legislative motive, which 
usually involves an investigation of legislative history.350 
Commentators have likened examination of legislative history 
to the arbitrariness of looking into a crowd and picking out 
one’s friends.351 
Note that the proposed reform of disparate impact doctrine 
still offers courts a meaningful limiting principle to combat 
concerns that frivolous cases, such as the hypothetical case on 
scientific research, would flood courts.352 Supplementing the 
discriminatory motive test with an antistereotyping exception 
should not stoke those fears. While there is plenty of commen- 
tary suggesting that racial profiling fosters racial stereotyp- 
ing,353 there is not a similar body of criticism that race-based 
funding of scientific research fosters stereotyping. The antiste- 
reotyping exception does not open the floodgates. 
Note also that allowing heightened review of disparate im- 
pact cases that entrench stereotyping should not mean that the 
policies at hand must fail. Heightened review should simply 
give courts authority to give these policies a serious second 
look, ensuring that policies that entrench stereotyping, such as 
racial profiling, are used extremely judiciously.354 
As discussed in Part II, criminality scripts profoundly im- 
pact democratic deliberation.355 As Jody Armour has pointed 
out, racial profiling produces a “chilling effect” among black 
men, who are often the victims of criminal profiling.356 Black 
men who fear being scripted have reasons to disengage from 
dialog with majoritarian communities, out of fear that they will 
 
 
350. See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Paradox of Expan- 
sionist Statutory Interpretations, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1226 (2007) (ex- 
plaining that the basic premise of the traditional model of statutory interpre- 
tation assumes that the legislature’s intent can be determined by the statute’s 
legislative history). 
351. See id. at 1229–30 (2007) (attributing the crowd metaphor to Judge 
Harold Levanthal). 
352. See supra note 337 and accompanying text. 
353. See supra note 341 and accompanying text. 
354. See supra note 313 and accompanying text. 
355. Although this Article focuses on how criminal profiling affects democ- 
racy by perpetuating identity scripts, it is worth noting that profiling policies 
also have a more direct effect on democracy: unequal rates of incarceration 
distort the collective nature of democratic rule. See Sklansky, supra note 341, 
at 1816–18 (explaining how disproportionate rates of incarceration have an 
“impoverishing” effect on democracy). 
356. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
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be prejudged as violent criminals.357 When black men do en- 
gage the majoritarian community, there are incentives for them 
to skew their expression to work around criminality scripts.358 
While Jody Armour focused on the chilling effect of blackness 
scripts,359 another example of profiling’s chilling effect can be 
found in the 2008 election cycle. As discussed above, the stereo- 
type of Muslims as terrorists likely had a chilling effect on Ob- 
ama when he was running for office.360 Because criminal profil- 
ing policies entrench these race- and religion-based scripts, 
they risk entrenching impairments to democratic deliberation. 
Accordingly, they warrant heightened scrutiny. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The United States has come a long way in remedying in- 
equalities. The 2008 election year highlights that fact. Individ- 
uals such as Barack Obama, Sarah Palin, and Hillary Clinton 
have put cracks—perhaps gaping holes—in the political glass 
ceilings that have hovered over African Americans and women. 
While this progress is certainly a cause for praise and celebra- 
tion,361 the celebration of these successes should not oversha- 
dow residual inequalities and other impairments to delibera- 
tion that still stifle American democracy.362 
This Article has illuminated some ways363 in which the so- 
cial salience of race and sex continues to hamper democratic 
 
 
357. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
358. See supra note 149 and accompanying text; see also Sklansky, supra 
note 341, at 1816 (arguing that racial profiling leads the profiled racial groups 
to “adopt roles of exaggerated deference and  severely  diminished  self-  
agency . . . [in] social life”). 
359. See Armour, supra note 149. 
360. See supra notes 129–34 and accompanying text. 
361. Barack Obama’s election elicited well-deserved praise from all over 
the world and renewed the United States’ reputation as a land of opportunity. 
See Ethan Bronner, The Promise: For Many Abroad, an Ideal Renewed, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at A1. 
362. It may be easy to overlook residual inequalities, especially with regard 
to race, since the media has characterized Barack Obama’s ascendency as 
ushering in a “post-racial” era. See supra note 230. For additional criticism 
against claims that the Obama presidency ushered in a post-racial era, see 
Camille A. Nelson, Racial Paradox and Eclipse: Obama as a Balm for What 
Ails Us, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 743, 744 –45 (2009). 
363. For discussion of another way in which race- and sex-based inequali- 
ties continue to stymie democracy, see Gregory S. Parks & Jeffrey J. Rachlins- 
ki, A Better Metric: The Role of Unconscious Race and Gender Bias in the 2008 
Presidential Race 2 (Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-007, 2008), 
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functioning. To ameliorate such impairments to  democracy, 
this Article proposed four ways to tailor equal protection doc- 
trine. First, bifurcate the test for suspect status. Second, regard 
all equally applied race and sex distinctions as disparate 
treatment that triggers heightened scrutiny. Third, ensure that 
a law’s contribution to combating identity scripts weighs in fa- 
vor of upholding the law. And fourth, in disparate impact cases, 
supplement the discriminatory-motive test for heightened scru- 
tiny with a test for laws’ stereotyping effects. These four pro- 
posals are examples of a script-oriented approach to democracy 
reinforcement. They seek to reinforce democracy by allowing 
courts to prevent the entrenchment of harmful identity script- 
ing and to correct for laws that emerged from script-tainted de- 
liberation in the first place. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1102704 (examining how unconscious 
biases affected the 2008 presidential race). 
